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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
In this research I first examine how Americans’ perceptions of what it takes to get ahead 
are influenced by their income and then compare those perceptions to measured levels of 
intergenerational socio-economic mobility. By better understanding these relationships I hope 
to gain insight into the paths people see to upward mobility, how this varies by income, and to 
what extent this belief is reflected in past mobility measurements. Additionally, I compare 
perceptions of what it takes to get ahead with responses regarding attitudes towards public 
assistance. The results of such a comparison could have important implications for public policy. 
The results reveal that there is a significant correlation between income and views of 
what it takes to get ahead with those at higher income levels perceiving greater levels of 
opportunity for mobility. Perceptions of opportunity for mobility appear high across all incomes 
relative to previous measurements of mobility. However, the low income group perceived less 
opportunity than the middle income group which reflects the pattern of measured levels of 
mobility. Also, views on the importance of educated parents and working hard are significant 
predictors of attitudes on public assistance. Belief in the less meritocratic indicators was 
associated with support for public assistance while belief in the more meritocratic indicators was 
associated with opposition.
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The promise of upward mobility, of getting ahead, has been an important part of the 
image of the United States since its inception, but is that promise being kept? Such opportunity 
is the central tenet of the American Dream, but has the dream faded? The idea that rags to riches 
is possible, that great success is attainable for those sufficiently determined, runs deep enough 
in the public consciousness that it is a common theme in popular fiction as well as political 
rhetoric (Page and Jacobs 2009; Kraus and Tan 2015). The questions are about who holds these 
beliefs, who experiences this type of mobility, and how those beliefs impact public policy views.  
Using perception data collected as part of the 2010 General Social Survey (Smith et al. 
2010) for the 2009 International Social Survey Program’s Social Inequality Module (ISSP 2012), I 
examine how Americans’ perceptions of what it takes to get ahead are influenced by their 
income. To put these perceptions into proper perspective, I then compare those perceptions to 
measured levels of intergenerational mobility for different income groups. Finally, I compare the 
responses on perceptions of what it takes to get ahead with responses regarding attitudes 
towards spending on public assistance. The intent of this final step is to examine the extent to 
which Americans who see the United States as more meritocratic with greater possibility for 
socio-economic mobility (SEM) through individual effort and accomplishment are less likely to 
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support public assistance. Previous research has found related links (Guetzkow 2010; Katz 2013), 
but the goal of this present research is to add to the existing body of literature though analysis 
of this highly appropriate and robust data set not previously used in this way. Also less common 
in the existing literature is investigation of how perceptions of economic mobility may be linked 
to the typical intergenerational mobility patterns of individuals at different levels of income.  
The goal of this research is to answer the following questions. 
 
RQ1A: Is there a relationship between income and perception of opportunity for 
socio-economic mobility?  
RQ1B: How do perceptions of opportunity for socio-economic mobility compare 
to measured levels of mobility at each level of income?  
RQ2: Is there a relationship between perceptions of socio-economic mobility and 
attitudes towards public assistance? 
 
RQ1A will allow me to determine if Americans’ relatively high average perceptions of mobility 
could be masking lower perceived levels in lower income groups as Jäntti et al. (2006) suggest 
and Griffith (2001) argues. RQ1B gives context to RQ1A. Only by comparing perceptions to the 
levels of mobility found in previous research does it become possible to understand if the 
perceptions are out of sync with levels of mobility in the way that Jäntti et al. (2006) and Griffith 
(2001) state. The features of these relationships have important implications for sociology, 
psychology, economics, and political science.  One of the most immediate practical applications 
for this information, however, is related specifically to public policy. With RQ2 I will begin to 
explore this. Individuals’ beliefs or perceptions drive their actions; perception is reality. Jäntti et 
al. (2006) suggest that an over perception of mobility could be responsible for a lack of political 
pressure for policies that would facilitate mobility. To determine if this is possible I will look for 
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a relationship between perceptions of what it takes to get ahead and attitudes towards 
spending on public assistance. If those who strongly believe mobility is possible through 
individual effort are more likely to oppose spending on public assistance, then what Jäntti et al. 
(2006) suggest is possible.  
Limited socio-economic mobility is positively correlated with higher rates of inequality 
(Björklund and Jäntti 1997; Solon 2004; Corak 2006; d’Addio 2007; Andrews and Leigh 2009; 
Causa and Johnson 2010; Corak 2013; cf. Torche 2015), yet Americans are more willing to accept 
high levels of inequality because of the promise of mobility (Shepelak 1987; Fields and Ok 1999; 
Benabou and Ok 2001; Bartels 2005; Isaacs, Sawhill, and Haskins 2008; Page and Jacobs 2009; 
Arawatari and Ono 2013; Corak 2013; Obama 2013; Stiglitz 2015; Davidai and Gilovich 2015). 
Both represent significant social problems that have deleterious effects not just on those with 
lower socio-economic status (SES), but on society at large (Persson and Tabellini 1994: Alesina, 
Di Tella, and MacCulloch 2004; Collins and Yeskel 2005; Stiglitz 2012; Stiglitz 2015). With higher 
levels of inequality economic growth is hindered (Persson and Tabellini 1994).  Highly unequal 
societies are inefficient as well as economically unstable and unsustainable (Stiglitz 2012).  One 
of the reasons for this inefficiency and stifled growth according to Joseph Stiglitz (2012) is that 
“Whenever we diminish equality of opportunity, we are not using one of our most valuable 
assets—our people—in the most productive way possible” (P. 117). Another aspect of the human 
cost is that with higher levels of inequality, people are less likely to report that they are happy 
even when controlling for income (Alesina et al. 2004). While some aspects of the relationship 
between mobility and inequality are complex, their negative correlation to each other and 
consequences for a society are well established. 
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While socio-economic mobility, or the opportunity for it, has been researched 
extensively, there are questions raised by such research that remain unanswered about how 
people perceive mobility, what shapes those perceptions, and how those perceptions influence 
public policy opinions. There are a few strongly related, but still distinct areas of research 
importance here. First is differentiation between types of mobility, followed by issues in 
measurement of mobility, and then established levels of mobility in the United States. Next is 
inequality as it relates to mobility and then an international comparison of perceived and 
measured mobility before a more detailed discussion of American perceptions of mobility and 
opportunity for mobility. This is followed by concepts more directly related to public assistance 
including the American Dream and social construction of deservingness. These issues are 
important worldwide, but the American Dream, the idea that anyone has the opportunity for 
advancement through hard work, is engrained in the American psyche in a way that adds an 
important cultural dimension to such research on the United States. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
 
Socio-economic Mobility 
Types of Socio-economic Mobility  
Mobility as used here should be understood as upward or downward movement through 
socio-economic strata. Unless otherwise stated, the focus is on intergenerational mobility, the 
difference in SES attainment of parents compared to their children.  This should not be confused 
with intragenerational mobility, the change in SES that people may experience within their adult 
lives. The mobility discussed in this research also refers to relative mobility, a change in SES such 
as moving from the working class to the middle class. This is different from absolute mobility 
which results from widespread economic upturns or downturns but not any change in relative 
position on the income ladder (Isaacs et al. 2008; Noah 2012). This issue is complicated by 
changes in income inequality that can allow widespread economic fluctuations to impact those 
at different income levels in unequal ways. As an example, however, if an economic boom allows 
the children of parents in the 60% income percentile to earn more than their parents, for 
example, they experience absolute upward mobility but not relative mobility if they remain near 
the 60th income percentile because average incomes have risen across the board. Another 
important distinction to make with regard to mobility depends on whether the strata are defined 
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with respect to wealth or income. Though wealth may be a better indicator of SES than income, 
out of necessity most mobility research is based on income or even occupation (usually as 
measured by a scale of occupational prestige) due to data limitations. Wealth data may be less 
available and harder to collect than income data, but it is a concern primarily when looking at 
the uppermost income quintiles where it is concentrated (Piketty 2014).   
The difference between opportunity for mobility and actual or experienced mobility is 
also important, but somewhat more difficult to address. The two are often used interchangeably 
with the levels of mobility found assumed to be indicative of the level of opportunity for mobility. 
However, it should be noted that this relationship between mobility and opportunity for mobility 
is not accepted by all (see Jenks and Tach 2006).  One possible source of controversy is differing 
definitions or understandings of equal opportunity (Roemer 2000). The relationship between 
experienced mobility and opportunity for mobility will be discussed further in the Results and 
Discussion section.   
 
Measuring Mobility 
Mobility, or the absence of mobility called elasticity, transmission, persistence (of 
status), or stickiness is difficult to measure. Though there are noteworthy currents within this 
area, different methods of research on mobility have yielded meaningfully different results 
regarding both levels and trends (Fields and Ok 1999; Jantti et al. 2006; Causa and Johnson 2010; 
Amiel et al 2015). Causa and Johnson (2010) note the complexity of the issue, the absence of an 
objective or easy to compare benchmark, and that “no single indicator provides a complete 
picture” (P. 3). The range and complexity of methodological choices in mobility research as well 
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as the sensitivity of the results to those choices (Isaacs et. al 2008) reduces the number of reliable 
results (Hauser 1998) and makes comparing the results of different studies precarious. For 
example, Beller and Hout (2006) as well as Lee and Solon (2009) express doubts about the 
findings in the earlier work of Becker and Tomes (1986). Becker and Tomes’ (1986) found very 
high levels of mobility concluding “Almost all the earnings advantages or disadvantages of 
ancestors are wiped out in three generations” (P. 25). This finding remained largely unopposed 
until research published in 1992 by Solon suggested there was far less mobility than previously 
found. The studies that followed typically found results closer to those of Solon (1992), than 
those of Becker and Tomes (1986).  It was suggested that this was not indicative of a change in 
levels of mobility, but rather that the earlier results were the product of flawed methods (Solon 
1992, 2009; Beller and Howt 2006).  
The elasticity of intergenerational income has already been thoroughly researched 
(Blanden 2013), but the immense difficulty and complexity of measuring such mobility has led 
to inconsistencies (Fields and Ok 1999; Lee and Solon 2009) that cloud the issue. Furthermore, 
there are aspects of mobility that are underrepresented in the literature. Average levels of 
income persistence or elasticity for a country as well as international comparisons are so 
numerous that I could not hope or dare to include all of them here.  To a lesser extent studies of 
mobility trends over time are also well represented. For the United States there is less research, 
however, about variations in intergenerational mobility based on sex, race, income, region, and 
other characteristics.  
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Levels of Mobility in the United States 
Though levels of mobility found vary for the reasons previously discussed, one of the 
lower reliable estimates is an average of 40% mobility (elasticity 0.6) across all income groups 
(Mazumder 2005) and on the high end 70% (Chetty et al 2014a, 2014b). Mazumder (2005) claims 
he found highest level of elasticity, or lowest level of mobility, because he is using more recent 
data than most from social security records. When he applied his methods to earlier data from 
another source he got results more similar to earlier studies implying that his methods where 
not the cause of the discrepancy, but rather that the more recent data revealed higher levels of 
elasticity than previously existed.  
Since how to measure the level of mobility is a challenging and somewhat controversial 
arena, attempts to identify its trends overtime are even more so. There is a noteworthy amount 
of research suggesting that levels of mobility are essentially stable (Hertz 2007; Lee and Solon 
2009; Chetty et al. 2014a, 2014b) as well decreasing (Auten and Gee 2009; Bradbury 2011; Noah 
2012). Understandably, there are also some who say the muddled results suggest that there is 
no clear trend or that a definitive statement cannot be made due to contradictory results (Isaacs 
et. al 2008; Torche 2015). It is significant that there does not appear to be any research 
suggesting an overall increase. 
Regarding current levels of SEM, the United States is typically found to have lower levels 
than comparable countries (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008; Bengali and Daly 2013), but what 
those levels are and the direction in which they are going is more controversial. There is a 
substantial body of work suggesting that mobility has declined (Bradbury and Katz 2002; 
Hungerford 2008; Bradbury 2011; Corak 2013), while others suggest an increase (U.S. 
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Department of Treasury 1992a, 1992b). There are also studies that have found levels of mobility 
in recent decades to be stagnant (McMurrer and Sawhill 1996; Acs and Zimmerman 2008; Auten 
2009). Some of these discrepancies can be explained by differences in the period of time 
examined and other methodological differences (Solon 1992, Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002). An 
example of a sampling choice that could result in such difference is the limitation of the age 
group included. The lower the upper limit placed on age for the sample, the higher the level of 
mobility found (Carroll, Joulfaian, and Rider 2006; Auten 2009).  
Though income is the demographic variable most central to this research, there are of 
course many other indicators that research has shown to impact mobility. There is a focus on 
fathers and sons because of the longitudinal nature of data required for mobility studies and 
issues with women’s labor force participation (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). This is more 
defensible in earlier work, but is becoming less so (Blanden 2013). One way to avoid the issue 
altogether is to use family income (Torche 2015). As an added benefit family income where it 
refers to the immediate family is preferable over individual income because it better indicator of 
SES (Mazumder 2005). However, this does not eliminate the need for research comparing the 
intricacies of mobility trends of sons and daughters since differences have been found (Jäntti et 
al. 2006; Causa and Johnson 2010). There is also a clear race based mobility gap. In multiple 
studies Americans identified as black have shown less upward mobility than those identified as 
white (Hertz 2005; Isaacs et. al 2008; Currier 2012; Economic Mobility Project 2012; Mazumder 
2014).  There is less research on location or geography, but what has been done has found 
location to be a significant factor determining levels of mobility (Chetty et al 2014c). 
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Since levels of mobility vary between people of different SES, reporting the results 
broken down into income quintiles, for example, gives a far different impression than an average 
for all income levels (Jäntti et al. 2006). For this and other reasons to be addressed, this work 
includes a focus on differences in responses based on the income of the respondent. Of the large 
number of studies on mobility in the United States only a small subset of those using data from 
a period ending in the last 20 years produced income specific results.  
A group of economists at the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis used 
tax returns from 1981 to 1995 to look at intragenerational mobility. They found that in the lowest 
quintile 54% were able to move up leaving 46% remaining there (Carroll et al. 2006). They also 
found that 53% of those in the highest quintile in 1981 were still there in 1995 meaning 47% fell 
below (Carroll et al. 2006). Regarding extreme mobility, 4% of people from the bottom income 
quintile moved to the top during this period, and 7.5% from the top fell to the bottom (Carroll et 
al. 2006). 
Jäntti et al. (2006) used data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth which 
included people born between 1957 and 1964 and compared family income from that time to 
children’s earnings in adulthood for the years 1995 and 2001. Looking only at males only, they 
found that over 40% of those born into the bottom quintile stayed there (60% mobility), while 
over 36% stayed in the top quintile (64% mobility). They point out an incongruity between the 
levels of mobility they found and the perception of mobility in the United States in particular 
among the other countries in their study. They speculate that Americans’ perceptions of SEM 
may be skewed upward because of higher levels of upward mobility experienced by the middle 
class. Specifically they suggest that knowledge of this mobility, either from experiencing or 
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witnessing it, might be overgeneralized to create the perception that it is more common than it 
actually is among all socio-economic strata (Jäntti et al. 2006).  
A report released by the Brookings Institute in 2008 used data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics collected beginning in 1968 with people ages 0-18 and followed until 2004. 
Brookings produced the stickiness numbers taking the mean of family income from 1967-1971 
and comparing it to the mean of the family income of the children, now adults, in five selected 
years in the 1990s and 2000s (Isaacs et al. 2008). They found a stickiness rate of 42% for the 
lowest income quintile meaning 58% chance of upward mobility into a higher quintile (Isaacs et 
al. 2008). They characterized these as “twice as high as would be expected by chance” (Isaacs et 
al. 2008:4).  They described the middle income group including the second, third, and fourth 
quintiles as having “roughly an equal shot at moving up or moving down and of ending up in a 
different income quintile than their parents” (Isaac et al. 2008:4). For the top income quintile 
they found the level of stickiness to be 39% leaving a 61% chance of downward mobility into a 
lower quintile (Isaacs et al. 2008).  
  
Income Inequality as it Relates to Mobility 
The question of mobility levels and trends may remain less than settled, but there is a 
general consensus that inequality is on the rise in recent decades (Morris and Western 1999; 
Piketty and Saez 2003; Collins and Yeskel 2005; Gottschalk and Danziger 2005; McCall 2005; 
Jacobs and Skocpol 2005; Bartels 2008; Goldin and Katz 2008; Isaacs et. al 2008; Kelly and Enns 
2010; Page and Jacobs 2009; Xu and Garand 2010; Stiglitz 2012; Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2015). 
Though this has not happened without consternation, the promise of mobility looms large and 
12 
 
makes it more palatable (Shepelak 1987; Fields and Ok 1999; Benabou and Ok 2001; Bartels 
2005; Isaacs et al. 2008; Page and Jacobs 2009; Arawatari and Ono 2013; Corak 2013; Obama 
2013; Stiglitz 2015; Davidai and Gilovich 2015). This valuation is not some less-than-conscious 
ideological undercurrent either; it is a feature, not a bug. In a 2013 speech President Barack 
Obama put it plainly,  
 
We've often accepted more income inequality than many other 
nations for one big reason -- because we were convinced that 
America is a place where even if you’re born with nothing, with a 
little hard work you can improve your own situation over time and 
build something better to leave your kids. As Lincoln once said, 
‘WhiIe we do not propose any war upon capital, we do wish to 
allow the humblest man an equal chance to get rich with 
everybody eIse’ (2013). 
 
This is not tacit approval, but rather open endorsement of this bargain. One problem with 
accepting inequality as long as mobility remains robust is the negative correlation between the 
two (Björklund and Jäntti 1997; Solon 2004; Corak 2006; d’Addio 2007; Andrews and Leigh 2009; 
Causa and Johnson 2010; Corak 2013; cf. Torche 2015). The president addressed this also in the 
same speech.  “This is the defining challenge of our time … The combined trends of increased 
inequality and decreasing mobility pose a fundamental threat to the American Dream, our way 
of life, and what we stand for around the globe” (Obama 2013). 
Americans’ acceptance of inequality cannot be traced to ideology alone but rather is 
rooted in complex political power relations that stretch back to the founding of the nation 
(Thompson 2007). Chetty et al. (2014b) suggest that trends in income and mobility have a 
complex interaction. They state, “Although rank-based measures of mobility remained stable, 
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income inequality increased over time in our sample, consistent with prior work.  Hence, the 
consequences of the ‘birth lottery’ – the parents to whom a child is born – are larger today than 
in the past” (Chetty et al. 2014b:141). Though the relationship between income and perceptions 
of mobility is limited, perceptions of inequality have been more thoroughly explored. From such 
research it is clear that factors like income do have an impact on perceptions of inequality 
(Alesina et al. 2004; Xu and Garand 2010). This suggests a relationship between income and 
perceptions of mobility or opportunity for mobility is also possible. 
 
International Comparison 
Adding another layer of complexity to the study of mobility and inequality in the United 
States is the growing wealth divide and stagnation of wages (Noah 2012). As a social problem 
this makes mobility research all the more important, but at the same time can make it more 
challenging for studies of the U.S. and international comparisons.  In international comparisons, 
the United States is often measured against nations such as Canada, the United Kingdom, 
France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. However, some researchers have added a 
caveat to the results of such work regarding income differences. If two countries have income 
distributions dissimilar enough, then even if their mobility levels are similar, outcomes for 
people in those countries can still be very different (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008; Blanden 
2013; Corak, Lindquist, and Mazumder 2014). Corak et al. (2014) find that  
 
It may be the case that moving 10 percentiles from the bottom of 
the earnings distribution is significantly more meaningful in the 
U.S. in terms of living standards than a comparable move in 
Sweden. For example, we find that upward mobility plays a much 
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larger role in the U.S. in terms of keeping an individual out of 
poverty than in Canada and Sweden (P. 19). 
 
While international comparisons of mobility are still meaningful and important, they must be 
interpreted in the context of the differing income distributions of the countries in question. 
Despite such findings Americans perceive high levels of mobility or opportunity for mobility 
compared to economically comparable countries (ISSP 2001; Isaacs et. al 2008; ISSP 2012). That 
higher perceived level of mobility does not appear to be paralleled by higher levels of actual 
mobility (Jäntti et al. 2006; d’Addio 2007; Isaacs et al. 2008; Causa and Johnson 2010; Noah 2012; 
Bengali and Daly 2013; Bjørnskov et al. 2013; Corak 2013; Mazumder 2014; Kraus and Tan 2015). 
It is possible that because the U.S. had higher levels of mobility than European nations from its 
founding through the 19th century (Ferrie 2005, Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2012) the idea still persists 
even though it is no longer the case. 
 
American Mobility Perceptions 
Comparing intergenerational mobility and attitudes towards it in the United States with 
that of other nations puts the peculiar trends of the U.S. into stark relief, but does not always 
make the reasons for those differences clear. One possible explanation is that Americans heavily 
prioritize equality of opportunity over equality of outcomes (Ladd and Bowman 1998; Benabou 
and Ok 2001; Page and Jacobs 2009; Obama 2013; Stiglitz 2015). A report from the American 
Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, addresses the importance of perceptions of 
opportunity. 
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Equality of opportunity is a demanding social standard. It requires 
that people perceive the rules of the game to be far. If they believe 
that this is the case, they put up with disparities in income and 
status. If people believe that the rules are being rigged to favor one 
group or another, inequality could become a more important 
political issue (Ladd and Bowman 1998:3). 
 
This report recognizes the lack of political pressure to reduce income inequality and that it 
hinges on a perception of fairness through equal opportunity. To explain their finding that the 
poor in the U.S. do not seem overly concerned with inequality compared to those in European 
nations, Alesina et al. (2004) contend, “these findings are consistent with the perception (not 
necessarily the reality) that Americans have been living in a mobile society, where individual 
effort can move people up and down the income ladder while Europeans believe that they live 
in less mobile societies” (P. 2009). A focus on equality of opportunity and the suggestion that it 
makes lived inequality more acceptable raises important questions. What does this imply about 
the perceived connection between opportunity and outcomes or lived experiences? At what 
point does a belief in opportunity become strained? To what extent does economic inequality 
reflect levels of opportunity or lack thereof? Or, more relevant to this work, to what extent do 
people attribute socio-economic mobility or lack thereof to opportunity or lack thereof?  
American’s perceptions of mobility do not typically reflect average levels of mobility 
experienced (Jantii et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008; Noah 2012; Bengali and Daly 2013; Bjørnskov 
at al. 2013; Kraus and Tan 2015), but the relationship between perception and “reality” is not as 
simple as everyone seeing more than there is. When this work began there did not appear to be 
any published studies that investigated the influence of income on perceptions of mobility (or 
opportunity for mobility) or compared those perceptions to measurements of mobility as this 
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work does. Very recently, however, two have been published that begin to fill this void. 
However, they used methods substantially different from this research (Chambers, Swan, and 
Heesacker 2014; Davidai and Gilovich 2014).  Both used survey questions where they asked 
participants to estimate the likelihood that a person born into a given income level or class would 
move up or down into a different one in their lifetimes. In contrast the research reported in this 
thesis uses questions about what it takes to get ahead in order to assess respondents’ 
perceptions of opportunity for upward mobility and how meritocratic or non-meritocratic the 
system is. This does not produce numbers directly representative of perceived levels of mobility, 
but rather perceived opportunity for mobility under the interpretation that perceiving the 
system as meritocratic corresponds to a perception that opportunity for mobility exists whereas 
perceiving the system as non-meritocratic corresponds to a perception that the opportunity for 
mobility is limited or non-existent 
In contrast to much previous research, Chambers et al. (2014) found that respondents 
underestimated the current level of mobility. Those sampled also seemed to believe that 
mobility has declined (Chambers et al. 2014) which previous studies are divided on. There was 
an ideological divide in these findings, however, with both of these results being more 
pronounced with politically liberal respondents (Chambers et al. 2014). Davidai and Gilovich 
(2014) also found an ideological divide with political conservatives perceiving more mobility, 
both up and down. However, their results showed that those with higher income also tended to 
perceive more mobility. Comparing to established levels of experienced mobility, as an average 
with all income groups and political persuasions they found that Americans see unrealistically 
high amounts of upward mobility and while underestimating downward mobility.   
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Horatio Alger’s rags to riches stories made upward mobility seem common and 
attainable (Carey 1973; Mazumder 2005; Auten 2009; Page and Jacobs 2009: Davidai and 
Gilovich 2014; Stiglitz 2015). Americans revere those said to have pulled themselves up by their 
own bootstraps, a figurative feat born out a literal impossibility. With increasing levels of 
inequality eroding SEM, Corak (2013) suggests that the American Dream is increasingly 
becoming just that, a dream. He explains “Relatively less upward mobility of the least 
advantaged is one reason why intergenerational mobility is lower in the United States than in 
other countries to which Americans are often compared” (Corak 2013:97). It is for this reason 
that he and others argue the American Dream is becoming increasingly more difficult to attain 
(Griffith 2001, Jäntti et al. 2006; Noah 2012; Corak 2013; Stiglitz 2015).  
 
Hypotheses for Income and Mobility  
Jäntti et al. (2006) suggest that a stronger belief in mobility among the middle class, who 
are more likely to experience mobility, skews the mean belief about mobility upward. I would 
suggest that this perception mean is likely to differ more from the level of mobility experienced 
by the working class than the upper class. The opportunity for mobility, particularly upward 
mobility, is a belief that serves to validate the position of those with higher socio-economic 
statuses and so I expect them to have similar views on mobility as those in the middle even if the 
levels they experience are lower. An important consideration is that Jäntti et al. (2006) discuss 
both upward and downward mobility, while the ISSP (2012) phrasing is more focused on upward 
mobility. I hypothesize that there will be a significant difference in what those in the lowest 
income quintile perceive it takes to get ahead compared to the middle and high income groups. 
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Specifically, I expect their responses to emphasize the ascribed and less individualistic 
requirements for upward mobility indicating that the system is non-meritocratic so there is less 
opportunity for mobility. I expect a more modest but still significant difference between the 
middle and higher income groups, but not with lower levels in the high groups as is seen with 
experienced mobility. Instead I expect higher income to correlate with a more meritocratic view 
of what it takes to get ahead. 
 
Attitudes Towards Public Assistance 
Americans’ perceptions of mobility are culturally informed by deeply held beliefs such as 
the American Dream and those perceptions influence support or opposition to public assistance 
(Steensland 2006, Loseke and Beahm 2013). Since the American Dream is built upon ideas of 
individualism, meritocracy, and equal opportunity it follows that it is most associated with 
opposition to public assistance.  Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony in society has 
special meaning in the context of the American Dream. In the United States not only do the poor 
adopt many of the dominant values of the rich, but this process is encouraged by the idea that 
the poor can and will become rich. This idea, this dream, has survived generations even in the 
face of relatively low levels socio-economic mobility.  
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1991) framework offers a way to understand why even people at lower 
income levels might adopt the values of those at higher income levels.  Through symbolic 
violence and the formation of habitus, dominant ideas like ‘the U.S is a meritocracy’ are 
legitimized and internalized, becoming part of  a person’s ideology (Bourdieu 1991; Appelrouth 
and Edles 2012; Harrits 2013). Even someone who does not make a lot of money, but who has 
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integrated the concept of the nation as a meritocracy into their world view might oppose welfare 
on the basis of that meritocratic ideal (Bullock, Williams, and Limbert 2003). This meritocratic 
ideal involves the assumption that people who work hard not just deserve success, but will 
achieve success, and only those who do not can fall into poverty. The construction of 
deservingness factors in heavily in the discourse on public assistance, with some people seen as 
deserving or underserving based on a complicated set of culturally informed factors (Kingfisher 
1999; Fullerton and Dixon 2009, Obrien and Major 2009; Guetzkow 2010; Hussey and Pearson-
Merkowitz 2011; Katz 2013). As Katz (2013) puts it, “This problem has been partly about the 
allocation of finite resources and partly about the exercise of moral judgement” (P. xii). 
The level of support or opposition to welfare varies based on income, race, and other 
demographics of respondents. In keeping with Marxist conflict theory, those with higher socio-
economic status are more likely to oppose welfare (Bullock et al. 2003; Abner 2011; Epstein 
2004), but the gap is not as large as might be expected based on a conflict framework (Epstein 
2004; Treier and Hillygus 2009). Opposition to welfare can be part of a larger and more complete 
individualistic, personal responsibility based, and freedom centered ideology that is not 
perceived to be compatible with support for welfare. “Politics is not about individual choices 
made in isolation; it is collective decision-making in circumstances where individual objectives 
cannot be achieved simultaneously” (Druckman and Lupia 2000:19), meaning not only are there 
competing interests between groups or individuals, but even an individual can possess 
competing interests. 
There is social psychological research that demonstrates in a related context the ease 
with which beliefs that disadvantage individuals may, nevertheless, be adopted and supported 
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by those very same individuals.  In a series of experiments Ridgeway (2001) found potent effects 
of interpersonal interactions on the formation and acceptance of unequal status constructions. 
Of particular relevance here is the ease with which she found people will adopt such status 
beliefs even when they are personally disadvantageous. Her finding that “interaction can spread 
status beliefs from person to person throughout the population” (Ridgeway 2001:273) has 
implications for views about welfare that may not seem to be in the viewer’s best interest. It 
implies that such ideas are not only surprisingly easy to instill, but also to proliferate even among 
those they work against. 
Some of the opposition to welfare stems from American ideas of individualism, 
meritocracy (Piketty 2014), and the assumption that welfare violates the Protestant work ethic 
(Weber 1904; Hasenfeld 1989). The logic in such case is that anyone who worked hard enough 
would not need such assistance and so they must be undeserving (Guetzkow 2010, Loseke and 
Beahm 2013). This view does not acknowledge systemic causes of poverty. Americans tend to 
favor individualist explanations for both wealth and poverty (Bullock et al. 2003; Collins and 
Yeskel 2005; Piketty 2014), but this is true to a lesser extent for economically disadvantaged 
groups. People of color, women, and those with lower incomes are more likely to favor structural 
explanations (Bullock et al. 2003). Gans (1994) argues that “the notion of undeservingness 
survives in part because of the positive functions it has for the better-off population” (P. 281). If 
a millionaire argues that someone living in poverty is poor due to laziness, the corresponding 
message is that he is rich because of hard work. A difference in attributions for wealth and 
poverty also happens along ideological lines with liberals tending towards structural attributions 
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and conservative favoring more individual explanations (Furnham 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986; 
Bullock et al. 2003; Chambers et al. 2015; Davidai and Gilovich 2015). 
The demographic makeup of public assistance recipients varies by program, location, 
and over time.  The levels of black identified and white identified recipients of benefits under the 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, commonly referred to as welfare, has 
remained very similar in recent years with black families making up 31.9% and white families 
31.8% in 2010 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and 
Families 2012). Racial minorities may be overrepresented among TANF recipients in comparison 
to the general population, but these nearly equal rates show racialized stereotypes of welfare 
recipients are unfounded. The “queen” aspect of the welfare queen stereotype is equally as hard 
to defend especially given the cuts to TANF and other public assistance programs, but the sex 
skewed aspect is accurate. As of 2010 only 14.8% of adult TANF recipients were male (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families 2012). 
Women and children are disproportionately represented as recipients of welfare for two clear 
reasons. Since women average lower levels of pay compared to men in equivalent positions and 
overall (Chauvin and Ash 1994; National Equal Pay Task Force 2013) they are more likely to 
qualify for welfare. Women are also more likely to be the single heads of household with 
dependent children.  
Dorsch (2010) argues that “economies with higher degrees of social mobility will choose 
lower levels of public consumption expenditures in equilibrium” (P. 37). This sentiment is echoed 
by Bartels (2005) and Franko et al. (2013). Dorsch (2010) describes this as an intuitive 
relationship. What is missing from much of this analysis is the consideration of the potential for 
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a gap between perception and experienced SEM.  What matters more for attitudes towards 
public assistance is how people perceive the chance for upward mobility. The basis by which they 
choose to explain economic success or failure determines the level of support (Nelson 1999; 
Fong 2001; Bullock, et al. 2003; Robinson 2009; Guertzkow 2010). This is a potential explanation 
for why those at the lower end of the SES spectrum do not necessarily support public assistance 
at the levels one might expect based on their higher potential need for it (Bartels 2005; Gilens 
2009; Dorsch 2010). Clearer understanding of these concepts has been shown to influence 
individual’s policy opinions and allow them to better act in their own self-interest (Franko, 
Tolbert, and Witko 2013). Despite this issue of perception that can cause people to adopt policies 
that may not appear in their own self-interest, there is still a relationship found between SES 
and attitudes towards public assistance with those with lower levels of SES more likely to 
support (Fong 2001; Epstein 2004). By comparing perception of SEM to measured SEM at 
different levels of SES, I hope to improve the understanding of this relationship.   
The attribution of socio-economic status can be divided into three basic categories: 
individual, structural, and fatalistic or having to do with luck (Bullock et al. 2003). In 2014 
comments by Congressman Paul Ryan one of the reasons he cited for his belief in a self-
reproducing culture of poverty was the work of Charles Murray (Bennett 2014; Kertscher 2014; 
Weigel 2014). Though Ryan did not specify which work by Murray, in his most famous work, The 
Bell Curve (1994), he and his co-writer Richard Herrnstein made an argument that fueled a still 
raging debate about biological causes of stratification. The two argued that there are racial 
differences in intelligence (Herrnstein and Murray 1994). Their controls for social and 
environmental factors were inadequate enough to make their findings suspect, but despite this, 
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it has been fodder for those seeking to legitimize racial and other forms of inequality. Paul 
appears to have been appealing to what Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) say is “racial 
animosity” in the U.S. which “makes redistribution to the poor, who are disproportionately 
black, unappealing to many voters” (P. 2). Gorski (2008) vehemently opposes these types of 
arguments made by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) and echoed by Ryan (Bennett 2014). He 
collectively calls it part of deficit theory, the idea that poverty is caused by some deficit within 
individuals in poverty and that it is part of a culture of poverty (Bullock et al. 2003; Gorski 2008).  
This is a plainly individualistic attribution for poverty and one that is not limited to one 
congressman, but rather has been expressed by many during legislative sessions where welfare 
was discussed (Loseke and Beahm 2013). 
By demeaning and ‘othering’ people in poverty, often using racist stereotypes, those 
who oppose welfare programs are able to make the target audience of such messages feel less 
connected to and responsible for those in poverty (Hussey, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2011; 
Fullerton and Dixon 2009). Beyond fighting efforts to maintain or increase spending on public 
assistance programs, the rich by distancing themselves from the poor in this way reinforce the 
idea that they have achieved their wealth and success through their own merits. People at any 
point on the SES spectrum can make such judgments about those at lower levels. It is for this 
reason, in part, that looking for variation in perception of SEM to measured SEM at different 
levels of SES is important. 
With racial or other kinds of negative stereotypes, members of the stereotyped group 
may internalize those negative views about other members of the group while thinking of 
themselves as an exception (Ellemers 2001). In this way, even targeted group of a negative 
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stereotype may believe it and perpetuate it to their own detriment. Someone who needs public 
assistance can also see themselves as in need due to circumstances beyond their control while 
still simultaneously thinking others in need are responsible for their situations and not deserving 
of help.  
Adorno et al. (1950) state that a person’s political ideology “reflects his personality and 
is not merely an aggregate of opinions picked up helter-skelter from the ideological 
environment” (P. 176). As such, a person’s personality is certainly reflected in his or her ideology 
(Jost Federico, and Napier 2009) and it is also an aggregate of carefully selected and internalized 
opinions (Bourdieu 1991). Such opinions can be selected on the basis consistency, even 
consistency of opposition. An inter-disciplinary investigation of political attitudinal 
development reveals strong support for the idea that “at the common environmental level, the 
structure of attitudes is consistent with the sociological model of attitude formation that 
suggests partisan rhetoric exaggerates the consistency between the social and economic 
ideological preferences” (Verhulst, Hatemi, and Eaves 2012:390). This suggests that some who 
may oppose welfare, do not do so because of any innate qualities of welfare as an issue, but 
because they oppose those who support it. 
Political polarization in the United States is at or near all-time highs depending on which 
measures are used (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Jost et al. 2009; Treier and Hillygus 
2009).  Though liberals tend to be more likely to support welfare and conservatives more likely 
to oppose, the high levels of polarization do not translate directly to a greater separation on the 
issue of welfare. Trends in levels of support or opposition to welfare are complex, but overall 
support appears to be diminishing over time and opposition rising (Epstein 2004). This is not a 
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simple, progressive, downward slide, however. There is research suggesting that support rises 
in difficult economic times (Kam and Nam 2008). Such exceptions to the downward trend hint 
at the nature and cause of opposition to welfare. Research into this phenomenon suggests that 
people’s perceptions of their own security, including economic security, is positively correlated 
with support for welfare and other aspects of political orientation and ideology (Carney et al. 
2008; Jost et al. 2009). This contradicts the idea that economic hardship might lead to pressure 
for more austere public spending, showing that people’s increased sensitivity to the need for 
welfare is stronger than budgetary concerns. It is for this reason among others that is it 
important to note that the ISSP (2012) data were collected in the US during the recovery from 
The Great Recession.  The earlier version of the same survey conducted in 1999 (ISSP 2002) did 
not include the question that serves as an indicator of support for or opposition to public 
assistance in this research so no direct comparison is possible.   
 
Hypotheses for Get Ahead and Public Assistance 
Based on this previous research I expect that those who believe more strongly in 
individualistic or meritocratic ways to get ahead will be less likely to support public assistance. I 
also expect that respondents in demographics more likely to need or receive public assistance 
will show stronger support for it.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
 
 The core of this research is quantitative analysis of data gathered as part of the Social 
Inequality portion of the International Social Survey Programme (2012) beginning its fourth 
round in 2009 worldwide1. In the United States, the data were collected as part of the General 
Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. A multi-stage, stratified, 
random sample of people 18 or older and not institutionalized were interviewed face to face 
between March 18 and August 14, 2010 nationwide. The survey items of special interest in the 
project are income, sex, race, views of what it takes to get ahead, and attitudes towards public 
assistance. Sex and race are control variables. Though the survey included over 1,500 American 
participants, 1,357 answered all of these survey items, therefore that is the sample size for this 
analysis.  
Since income levels are central to this analysis I continue this section with a detailed 
discussion of the coding and other methodological considerations for this variable and how they 
relate to subjective class identification. While subjective class identification is not a focus of this 
                                                           
1 The complete list of countries is Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
USA, and Venezuela. 
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research, how people identify their own place in the hierarchy of socio-economic status is 
relevant to their mobility related perceptions. The discussion of income is followed by an 
explanation of the coding of the get ahead survey items and then the analysis for each of the 
research questions. For RQ1A the independent variable is income and the dependents are views 
of what it takes to get ahead. RQ1B involves comparison of those views broken down by income 
to existing mobility data for those income groups. For RQ2 the independent variables are views 
of what it takes to get ahead and the dependent variable is attitude towards spending on public 
assistance.  
 
Construction of Income Categories and Comparison to Class 
For income, interviewers asked respondents “In which of these groups did your total 
family income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes, that is” (Smith 2013:186). 
Respondents had 25 income groups to choose from (See Appendix A).  The income groups are 
numerous and narrow enough to capture and represent the respondent’s income status, but 
having the data grouped in this way rather than in exact dollar amounts necessitated recoding.  
As they were, the bottom 20% of incomes made up the bottom 48% of the categories, 1-12 of 
25. Using these skewed categories would produce skewed results. To correct for this I have 
constructed two more representative coding schemes. The first uses the midpoint of the dollar 
range for that group as the income for all respondents in that group. For example, for the 
$20,000 to $22,499 group the mean rounded to the nearest dollar is $21,250, therefore $21,250 
is used as the income for all respondents who reported their total family income fell in that 
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group. The first group, $1,000 and less, is represented by $500. The last group, 25 of 25, $150,000 
and over, is coded as $150,000 (See Appendix B).  
The second coding scheme is based on the income quintiles similar to much previous 
mobility research. To define the quintiles I chose the cut points that fell closest to 20%, 40%, 
60%, and 80% of respondents in order to produce five groups with approximately equal numbers 
of respondents, as close to equal as the predefined categories allowed. The first quintile includes 
those who reported $19,999 or less of total family income, second quintile $20,000-34,999, third 
$35,000-59,999, fourth $60,000-89,999, and the fifth quintile includes those who reported 
$90,000 and over.  For some methods of analysis I have combined the second, third, and fourth 
quintiles to facilitate comparison to previous research where this is typical.  This leaves a low 
income category which includes only the first income quintile, a middle income category for the 
second through fourth quintiles, and a high income category which includes only the top income 
quintile.  
Respondents were asked to report their own class in addition to family income. Though 
issues of class are relevant here, income rather than class is the more useful measure for this 
analysis for two reasons. First, since income, and especially income quintiles, is more typically 
used for mobility research using the same approach here facilitates more meaningful 
comparison to previous work. The second reason is the subjectivity and complexity of class 
labels, which is likely why they are not favored in more research. Since class labels cannot be 
depended upon and used in the same way income data can, income is the more meaningful and 
useful measure.  However, since how respondents identify their place in the class hierarchy is 
relevant to work such as this regarding perceptions, it is worth further investigation.  
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For class, respondents were given the choices lower, working, lower middle, middle, 
upper middle, and upper class. Table 1 shows the cross tabulation of these classes collapsed into 
three groups with the collapsed income quintiles previously described as well as and resulting 
chi-square value. 
 
Table 1. Cross Tabulation of Total Family Income and Self-Reported Class 
χ² = 213.67, p < .001  
Income   
Low Middle High  
Q1 Q2, Q3, Q4 Q5  
$0 - 
19,999 
$20,000 - 
89,999 
$90,000 - 
150,000+ Total 
Class 
Lower  
and  
Working 
Count 146% 351% 45% 542% 
% within Low, Mid, or High Income 57% 43% 16% 40% 
% of Total 11% 26% 3% 40% 
Lower Middle 
and  
Middle 
Count 101% 437% 166% 704% 
% within Low, Mid, or High Income 39% 54% 59% 52% 
% of Total 7% 32% 12% 52% 
Upper Middle 
and  
Upper 
Count 9% 25% 72% 106% 
% within Low, Mid, or High Income 4% 3% 25% 8% 
% of Total 1% 2% 5% 8% 
Total 
Count 256% 813% 283% 1352% 
% within Low, Mid, or High Income 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% of Total 19% 60% 21% 100% 
n = 1352  
 
The chi-square value shows that there is a significant and strong relationship between 
income and class. However, a closer look at the cross tabulation shows that income group does 
not predict self-identified class in the pattern that might be assumed. The cross tabulation of 
income and class reveals a notable number of respondents with low income identifying as 
middle and upper class and high income respondents identifying as working or middle class. 
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Only somewhat slim majorities of those in the low and middle income groups identify with the 
superficially corresponding classes. 
Most notably 39% of respondents in the lowest income quartile identified as lower 
middle or middle class rather than lower or working class and 4% reported they were either 
upper middle or upper class. Among those in the highest income quintile, only 25% identified as 
upper or upper middle class. A majority of the highest income quintile, 59%, reported that they 
were part of the lower middle or middle class. Another 16% of people in the highest income 
quintile called themselves lower or working class. There are several potential reasons for this 
seeming incongruity, but what is most important to this analysis is that there is a notable 
incongruity. Respondents may have found it more comfortable to identify as middle class to the 
interviewer.  They may lack understanding of the class labels or have inaccurate ideas about their 
meanings. This may also result from geographic differences in the cost of living. Though the 
potential reasons are interesting, what is important for the purpose for this research is that 
family income is the more "objective" indicator. 
 
Coding of Getting Ahead Variables 
For research question 1a, in order to assess differences in perception of mobility among 
those at different income levels for RQ1a and compare those perceptions to measurements of 
mobility for research question 1b, I used the following questions from the ISSP (2012) (See 
Appendix A for survey materials showing these and other questions used in this research). These 
will be referred to as the “get ahead” variables. 
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1. Please show for each of these how important you think it is for 
getting ahead in life. How important is… 
a.) …coming from a wealthy family?  
b.) …having well educated parents? 
c.) …knowing the right people 
d.) …hard work? 
e.) …having ambition? (Smith et al. 2013: 2198-2201) 
 
For each question, the interviewer presented respondents with an ordinal scale and asked them 
to rate that survey item as “Essential (1), Very Important (2), Fairly Important(3), Not Very 
Important (4), or Not important at all (5)” (Smith et al. 2013: 2198-2201). They were also given a 
“Can’t choose” option which is not part of this analysis.  
For some types of analyses all five of these variables are combined into a composite 
measure representing each respondent’s overall attribution for what the survey calls “getting 
ahead.” In the getting ahead composite the responses to 1a, 1b, and 1c have the original coding. 
Note that the agreement with the first three statements indicates a non-meritocratic view of 
what it takes to get ahead while agreement with the last two statements indicates a more 
meritocratic perception.  Therefore, in building the composite measure, the last two responses 
must be reverse coded before they are added to the response scores from the first three 
questions. In the getting ahead composite the responses to 1a, 1b, and 1c are coded as Essential 
= 1, Very Important = 2, Fairly Important = 3, Not Very Important = 4, Not Important at All = 5. 
For the questions 1d and 1e the coding is reversed for the composite only, so that Essential = 5, 
Very Important = 4, Fairly Important = 3, Not Very Important = 2, and Not Important at All = 1. 
The sum of the values from answers to all five of the getting ahead variables with this recoding 
comprise the getting ahead composite. Since there are five component variables with scales of 
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1 through 5, the scale or possible range of the composite is 5 through 25. Here is an example of 
the composite calculation. 
 
Table 2. Calculation Example for Getting Ahead Composite 
Coding Variable Response Value 
Original 
  Wealthy Family Not Very Important 4 
Essential = 1 
Very Important = 2 
Educated Parents Essential  1 
Fairly Important = 3 
Not Very Important = 4 
Know Right People Not Very Important 4 
Not Important at All = 5 
Reversed 
        
Essential = 5 
Hard Work Essential  5 
Very Important = 4 
Fairly Important = 3 
Ambition Fairly Important  3 
Not Very Important = 2 
Not Important at All = 1    
    Getting Ahead Composite Score: 17 
 
With this coding higher numbers in the sum will represent a more meritocratic perception 
indicative of a belief in greater opportunity for upward mobility. Questions 1a, 1b, and 1c 
represent an inherited route to high SES implying a rigid social structure with limited SEM, so 
disagreement with this is scored highly. Questions 1d and 1e represent a route with individual 
agency allowing for the greater possibility of SEM with fewer ascribed impediments, so 
agreement is scored highly. Furthermore, because of this difference it is expected that 1a, 1b, 
and 1c will be negatively correlated with 1d and 1e. 
 
RQ1A and RQ1B – Income, Perceptions of Opportunity for Mobility, and Mobility 
The first set of results is from an analysis of the responses to each getting ahead item by 
income quintile. The expectation is that the lowest income quintile will differ significantly from 
the middle and upper ones and display mobility perceptions that skew towards the less 
meritocratic and more inherited modes of getting ahead. Though the upper quintile has been 
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found to have lower levels of mobility than the middle quintiles (Jäntti  et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 
2008), I do not expect that to equate to more limited perceptions of opportunity for mobility 
because a meritocratic view of opportunity for mobility serves to validate the SES of those in 
this group. 
This analysis is elaborated by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the income 
categories (low, middle, and high) as the independent variable and the getting ahead composite 
as the dependent variable. This facilitates a comparison among income groups with respect to 
their average level of perceived opportunity for mobility. Further, it allows for additional 
confirmation or refutation of the suggestion that greater opportunity for mobility is perceived 
by those in the middle income quintiles pushing up the average and obscuring the lower 
opportunity for mobility perceived by those with lower income. The next step involves a 
comparison of the perceptions of each income group to the levels of mobility typically found in 
other research for respondents in these quintiles.  This makes it possible to determine if the 
perceptions are related to differences in experienced mobility.  
The next step involves a comparison of the perceptions of each income group to the 
levels of mobility found in other research.  This makes it possible to determine if the perceptions 
are notably different from experienced mobility levels. Without such a difference an unrealistic 
perception could not be responsible a lack of political pressure for changes to public policy that 
would promote mobility as Jäntti et al. (2006) suggest.  
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RQ2 – Perceptions of Opportunity for Mobility and Attitudes Towards Public Assistance 
For the final research question (RQ2) about the relationship between Americans’ 
perceptions of socio-economic mobility and attitudes towards public assistance, the following 
question will represent the level of support or opposition to public assistance.  
 
2. Do you agree or disagree? 
a.) The government should spend less on benefits for the 
poor (Smith et al. 2013: 2198-2201) 
 
In the survey the answers available and their coding are strongly agree = 1, agree = 2, neither = 
3, disagree = 4, and strongly disagree = 5. With this coding scheme lower scores indicate 
opposition to public assistance, while higher scores indicate support for public assistance. For 
simplicity, this variable is referred to as attitudes towards public assistance. I performed a 
multiple linear regression with the individual get ahead variables as the predictors or 
independent variables and attitudes towards public assistance as the dependent. Controls for 
income, sex, and race were also added in a second regression model for the purpose of 
comparison. Rather than the low, middle, and high income categories used in the ANOVA, the 
regression was completed using income in the previously described five quintiles. A simplified 
race variable was required because of sample size limitations. It included one category for 
respondents who identified as “white” coded as 0 and another category for respondents who 
identified as “black” or “other” coded as 1. For sex the categories were male (0) and female (1). 
Rather than the low, middle, and high income categories used in the ANOVA, analysis 
for RQ2 involves regressions including income in two other forms. The first uses income quintiles 
like the ANOVA, but unlike the ANOVA uses all five instead of grouping them into low, middle, 
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and high. The second uses dollar amounts representative of each of the income categories that 
respondents were able to choose from as previously discussed in this section (see Appendix B).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables. The 
standard deviations are high for the public assistance, getting ahead, and income variables 
relative to their ranges showing that there is a great deal of dispersion. Looking at the individual 
get ahead variables, the ones indicative of ascribed modes of getting ahead (wealthy family, 
educated parents, and knowing the right people) are all significantly and moderately correlated. 
Similarly, the variables more associated with meritocratic views of what it takes to get ahead 
(hard work and ambition) are also significantly correlated, but more strongly. Despite this, only 
three of the six possible correlations between the systemic and meritocratic variables are 
significant and only one of those is negative. This does not support the hypothesis that these 
two contrasting types of variables would all be negatively correlated. The two that were 
significantly and negatively correlated can be considered the most representative of each of 
their types. The wealthy parents variable epitomizes the systemic and unmeritocratic 
contingent and hard work is most representative of the individualistic and meritocratic variables.  
The two codings of income, predictably, have a significant and extremely strong correlation, 
.935. The difference in their correlations with other variables are also no more than .016 showing 
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Table 3. Descriptives and Correlations for Get Ahead Variables and Attitudes Towards Public Assistance 
 
Public 
Assistance 
Wealthy 
Family 
Educated 
Parents 
Know 
Right 
People 
Hard 
Work 
Ambition 
Getting 
Ahead 
Composite 
Income 
Quintile 
Income  
$ 
Midpoint 
Sex Race 
  
Mean 3.570 3.133 2.590 2.560 1.590 1.680 17.016 3.028 57977.89 0.539 0.221 
Standard Deviation 1.024 1.074 0.875 0.860 0.592 0.661 2.333 1.401 41960.51 0.499 0.415 
Public Assistance       --           
Wealthy Family -.067**   --          
Educated Parents -.126** .399**    --         
Know Right People -.093** .366** .312**   --        
Hard Work _.085** -.054** .044** .067**   --       
Ambition _.056** .013** .026** .156** .476**   --      
Getting Ahead Composite -.149** .755** .655** .593** -.372** -.331**     --     
Income Quintile -.198** .100** .116** .110** -.074** -.099** .178**   --    
Income Dollars -.191** .099** .105** .111** -.076** -.102** .174** .935** --   
Sex _.026** .053** -.003** .036** -.053** -.006** .052** -.120** -.104**    --  
Race _.132** -.146** -.202** -.191** .026** .066** -.238** -.163** -.151** .022** -- 
*p < .05     **p < .01      (one-tailed test)             n = 1357 
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that they represent respondents’ incomes similarly. They are significantly correlated with every 
other variable as well making it likely that income will have predictive power in this analysis. 
Notably, income has a weak to moderate, but solidly significant, correlation with the getting 
ahead composite and public assistance. 
Race is significantly though weakly correlated with public assistance. With the 0 = white, 
1 = all racial identifications other than white coding, this means white respondents were less 
likely to support public assistance. It is impossible to determine the cause for this, however, 
based on these data. Therefore, no conclusions can be made regarding findings like those of 
Alesina (et al. 2001) that racial animosity is the source of opposition to public assistance by white 
respondents. The high correlation of income and relationship between race and income also 
begs the question of whether the effect of income is being captured in the race-public assistance 
correlation.  
Of all variables, sex has the lowest number of significant correlations and all of them are 
weak. Of the getting ahead variables, sex only correlated significantly with wealthy family and 
hard work. Since male = 0 and female = 1 the positive weak correlation with wealthy family and 
equally negative correlation with hard work implies a slight tendency toward systemic or 
inherited attributions for upward mobility. The negative correlation between sex and income 
seen here is as expected based on the well-established trend of females earning less than males 
(National Equal Pay Task Force 2013). Notably, sex is not significantly correlated with attitudes 
towards public assistance which is interesting considering females are disproportionally 
represented among TANF recipients.   
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Most of the correlations are weak or moderate excluding the designedly strong 
correlations of the composite with its constituent variables and the two different methods of 
coding income. Some of the significant correlations suggest that other analysis will reveal 
significant results. 
 
Income and Perception of Opportunity for Upward Mobility 
 The tables below show the cross tabulations of the get ahead variables and income and 
the chi-square value for each. The cells with greater than expected values are shaded for the 
tables with significant chi-square values.  
 
Table 4. Importance of Wealthy Family to Getting Ahead by Income 
χ² = 33.80, p < .001 
How important is coming from a wealthy family? 
 
Essential Very Fairly 
Not 
Very 
Not At 
All 
Total 
 Income 
Low,  
Q1 
Count 22 79 70 54 33 258 
Expected Count 13.3 64.3 84.8 66.0 29.7 258.0 
% within Low Income 8.5% 30.6% 27.1% 20.9% 12.8% 100.0% 
Mid,  
Q2-Q4 
Count 41 205 254 219 97 816 
Expected Count 42.1 203.2 268.2 208.7 93.8 816.0 
% within Low Income 5.0% 25.1% 31.1% 26.8% 11.9% 100.0% 
High,  
Q5 
Count 7 54 122 74 26 283 
Expected Count 14.6 70.5 93.0 72.4 32.5 283.0 
% within High Income 2.5% 19.1% 43.1% 26.1% 9.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 70 338 446 347 156 1357 
Expected Count 70.0 338.0 446.0 347.0 156.0 1357.0 
% within Income 5.2% 24.9% 32.9% 25.6% 11.5% 100.0% 
       n = 1357 
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Table 5. Importance of Educated Parents to Getting Ahead by Income 
χ² = 30.78, p < .001 
How important is having well educated parents? 
 
Essential Very Fairly 
Not 
Very 
Not At 
All 
Total 
 Income 
Low,  
Q1 
Count 29 132 72 20 5 258 
Expected Count 19.0 108.8 96.2 26.8 7.2 258.0 
% within Low Income 11.2% 51.2% 27.9% 7.8% 1.9% 100.0% 
Mid,  
Q2-Q4 
Count 54 340 303 93 26 816 
Expected Count 60.1 344.0 304.3 84.8 22.9 816.0 
% within Low Income 6.6% 41.7% 37.1% 11.4% 3.2% 100.0% 
High,  
Q5 
Count 17 100 131 28 7 283 
Expected Count 20.9 119.3 105.5 29.4 7.9 283.0 
% within High Income 6.0% 35.3% 46.3% 9.9% 2.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 100 572 506 141 38 1357 
Expected Count 100.0 572.0 506.0 141.0 38.0 1357.0 
% within Income 7.4% 42.2% 37.3% 10.4% 2.8% 100.0% 
       n = 1357 
 
Table 6. Importance of Knowing the Right People to Getting Ahead by Income 
χ² = 51.55, p < .001 
How important is knowing the right people? 
 
Essential Very Fairly 
Not 
Very 
Not At 
All 
Total 
 Income 
Low,  
Q1 
Count 39 115 75 20 9 258 
Expected Count 26.8 92.0 109.5 26.0 3.6 258.0 
% within Low Income 15.1% 44.6% 29.1% 7.8% 3.5% 100.0% 
Mid,  
Q2-Q4 
Count 74 293 349 91 9 816 
Expected Count 84.8 291.0 346.4 82.4 11.4 816.0 
% within Low Income 9.1% 35.9% 42.8% 11.2% 1.1% 100.0% 
High,  
Q5 
Count 28 76 152 26 1 283 
Expected Count 29.4 100.9 120.1 28.6 4.0 283.0 
% within High Income 9.9% 26.9% 53.7% 9.2% 0.4% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 141 484 576 137 19 1357 
Expected Count 141.0 484.0 576.0 137.0 19.0 1357.0 
% within Income 10.4% 35.7% 42.4% 10.1% 1.4% 100.0% 
       n = 1357 
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Table 7. Importance of Hard Work to Getting Ahead by Income 
χ² = 11.57, p = .171 
How important is hard work? 
 
Essential Very Fairly 
Not 
Very 
Not At 
All 
Total 
 Income 
Low,  
Q1 
Count 96 150 10 1 1 258 
Expected Count 116.7 130.6 9.5 0.8 0.4 258.0 
% within Low Income 37.2% 58.1% 3.9% 0.4% 0.4% 100.0% 
Mid,  
Q2-Q4 
Count 380 400 32 3 1 816 
Expected Count 369.2 413.1 30.1 2.4 1.2 816.0 
% within Low Income 46.6% 49.0% 3.9% 0.4% 0.1% 100.0% 
High,  
Q5 
Count 138 137 8 0 0 283 
Expected Count 128.0 143.3 10.4 0.8 0.4 283.0 
% within High Income 48.8% 48.4% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 614 687 50 4 2 1357 
Expected Count 614.0 687.0 50.0 4.0 2.0 1357.0 
% within Income 45.2% 50.6% 3.7% 0.3% 0.1% 100.0% 
       n = 1357 
 
Table 8. Importance of Having Ambition Getting Ahead by Income 
χ² = 24.38, p = .002 
How important is having ambition? 
 
Essential Very Fairly 
Not 
Very 
Not At 
All 
Total 
 Income 
Low,  
Q1 
Count 90 137 22 8 1 258 
Expected Count 107.2 129.9 17.9 2.7 0.4 258.0 
% within Low Income 34.9% 53.1% 8.5% 3.1% 0.4% 100.0% 
Mid,  
Q2-Q4 
Count 338 417 54 6 1 816 
Expected Count 339.1 410.7 56.5 8.4 1.2 816.0 
% within Low Income 41.4% 51.1% 6.6% 0.7% 0.1% 100.0% 
High,  
Q5 
Count 136 129 18 0 0 283 
Expected Count 117.6 142.4 19.6 2.9 0.4 283.0 
% within High Income 48.1% 45.6% 6.4% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 564 683 94 14 2 1357 
Expected Count 564.0 683.0 94.0 14.0 2.0 1357.0 
% within Income 41.6% 50.3% 6.9% 1.0% 0.1% 100.0% 
       n = 1357 
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The chi-square values for the get ahead variables were all significant except for the hard 
work variable. There was a clear trend in the answers to the question of how important hard 
work is to getting ahead, but it was mostly uniform across all income groups. Over 95% of 
respondents regardless of income answered that hard work was either essential or very 
important. Even though the overall relationship to income was not significant, within those two 
answers the distribution did vary by income in a clear way. Those in the lowest income trended 
more towards very important rather than essential with 37.2% calling it essential and 58.1% 
calling very important. This is in contrast to the middle and high income groups who answered 
46.6% essential and 49% very important, and 48.1% essential and 45.6% very important 
respectively.  
The survey also included a question about the importance of getting an education 
yourself. In fact, a great deal of mobility research focuses on educational attainment. Like the 
hard work question it was also not significant in certain types of preliminary testing. However, I 
choose not to include it while including hard work because the self-education results do not have 
as many implications beyond the perceived importance of education to getting ahead. The get 
ahead survey items included here have more clear implications about the respondents’ 
attributions for mobility beyond those individual questions. They are all easily categorized as 
representative of a more meritocratic perception or a more systemic view. Getting a college 
degree is easier and more likely for those in higher income groups, but it ostensibly requires 
talent, skills, and hard work making the implications of the survey question mixed in a way that 
made it less useful to this research.  
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 The survey question about knowing the right people could hypothetically work in a 
similar way with overlap between being to some degree inherited and some degree self-made. 
However, it since the right people in this context are presumably people with higher socio-
economic status it seems more likely that someone would know “the right people” if he or she 
was also part of that social stratum even if it is not absolutely required. It is impossible to know 
how respondents conceptualized “knowing the right people,” however, the moderate positive 
correlation of this variable with variables such as wealthy parents suggests a similar line of 
thought or association. 
 In the tables for the ascribed traits, Table 4, wealthy family, Table 5, educated parents, 
and Table 6, knowing the right people, there is trend opposite of what Table 8, ambition, an 
achieved characteristic, displays. In Tables 4, Table 5, and Table 6 the low income group tends 
to have greater than expected counts in the essential and very important categories. This shows 
that those in the lowest income group are more likely to perceive inherited traits as important 
to getting ahead and therefore see opportunity for mobility through individual effort as more 
limited. The middle income group tends to exceed expected counts closer to the other end of 
the answer spectrum particularly calling them not very important. This points to more 
meritocratic perceptions of what it takes to get ahead since they find these inherited traits as 
less important. The implications of the answers of the high income group are less clear since 
their counts tend to exceed expected around the middle for wealthy family, educated parents, 
and knowing the right people. These trends is most clear with wealthy family and educated 
parents, but it is also present with know the right people. Looking at all of the shaded areas this 
trend is present, but less focused. It is even more visible when focusing on the cells where the 
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difference between the expected and actual counts is larger when adjusted for the size of the 
expected count. 
With ambition the trends for the low and middle income groups are reversed which is 
unsurprising given that placing importance on ambition, an achieved characteristic, runs 
counter to placing importance on inherited characteristics such as having wealthy parents. 
Though significant, the relationship between income and believing ambition is an important 
part of getting ahead is not as strong as wealthy family, educated parents, or knowing the right 
people. Like hard work, all income groups seemed to believe strongly in the importance of 
ambition to getting ahead. Also like hard work this is more true the higher the income of the 
respondent. Even though all income groups tend to report ambition is important, the lower the 
income, the less strongly a respondent is likely to feel about it. 
 To elaborate upon the relation between income and the get ahead variables, I next use 
the same collapsed income quintiles but with the get ahead composite rather than the individual 
variables for a different type of analysis. A one-way (ANOVA) with collapsed income quintiles 
(low, middle, and high) as the independent variable and the getting ahead composite as the 
dependent also indicated that mobility perceptions do vary with income. The ANOVA yielded 
significant results, F(2, 1354) = 18.022, p < .001,  r = 0.03. Though significant even at the p < .001 
level, the effect size of 0.03 is small. This suggests that Jäntti et al. (2006) were correct in their 
assertion that perception of mobility is different based on class, but the effect may not be large 
enough to explain much of the phenomena they hypothesize result from this difference. Post 
hoc testing using Tukey’s HSD reveals that the significant result in the ANOVA is driven entirely 
by a significant difference between the low income group and the other groups. The descriptive 
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statistics below show a small difference between the middle and high income groups, but 
Tukey’s HSD indicates it is not significant.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean getting ahead composite scores. Since the composite is the 
sum of the five getting ahead measures coded with the more individualistic or meritocratic 
answers as higher values, higher composite values represent more meritocratic views and a 
perception of opportunity for mobility. The range of possible values for the getting ahead 
composite is 5 to 25, therefore the means in Figure 1 show an overall trend towards the higher 
end of this measure. This suggests that respondents perceive high levels of opportunity for 
mobility in all income categories, though to varying degrees. Across all incomes the actual range 
(rather than possible range) was 11-25 with a mean of 17.02, median of 17, and mode of 17 
resulting from a nearly perfectly symmetrical distribution.    
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Figure 1. Getting Ahead Composite Means
(n = 1357)
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As hypothesized the lower income group perceives less opportunity for mobility through 
individual effort than other groups, though still more than most previous research would 
suggest. The gap between the means of the low income and middle income group is larger than 
the difference between the middle and high groups, but is not as large as expected based on 
differences in levels of mobility found in previous research (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008). 
These differences are not great enough to offer strong support for arguments made by Griffith 
(2001) and echoed by Jäntti et al. (2006) that those in lower income brackets are fully aware of 
their relatively limited chances for upward mobility, while those in the middle class are relatively 
confident in their chances for advancement. Though the levels of opportunity for mobility 
perceived are quite tightly grouped, the pattern does not diverge entirely from previous theories 
and findings.  The low income group does have the most limited view of mobility and there is a 
larger rise in the mean between the low and middle than between the middle and upper. Though 
this pattern does not match measurements of mobility, the differentiation between those with 
the lowest incomes and everyone else is in line with past research on perceptions of inequality 
(Xu and Garand 2010). 
 
Comparison to Measured Mobility 
Since the range for the getting ahead composite is 20, multiplying the means by five puts 
them on the same scale as the measured percentage chances of mobility. These adjusted 
perception means are low 81.35, middle 85.60, and high 86.95. This pattern of perception of 
mobility has ways in which it is both similar to and different from the levels of experienced or 
measured mobility found in previous research. Despite the challenges in measuring mobility and 
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the resulting inconsistencies, there is a trend among research on different levels of mobility for 
different income groups. Jäntti et al. (2006) found 57.8% mobility for the lowest quintile, 75% in 
the middle (Q2-Q4), and 66% at the top using data from the National Longitudinal Study of 
Youth. Similarly, Isaacs et al. (2008) found 58% at the bottom, 74% in the middle and 61% at the 
top using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from a similar period. Studies reliably 
find lower levels of mobility or more stickiness in the bottom and top income quintiles compared 
to the middle (Carroll et al. 2006; Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008). 
The pattern and levels do not match the perception results here. However, as previously 
discussed, the perception of the chance at upward mobility of those in the top income quintile 
may be expected to be high relative to levels of mobility experienced because of the self-
justifying nature of such a belief. Setting the high income perceptions aside for this reason and 
focusing on the perceptions of those in the low and middle groups, it is clear that the relative 
positions of the income groups do essentially match. Compared to the middle income group, 
there is both less mobility experienced and perceived, though both perception means are quite 
high and the difference between the low and middle perceptions is not as large as the difference 
in experienced mobility. The most obvious reason for this discrepancy is the idea of the 
American Dream and the tendency of Americans to overestimate the possibility for upward 
mobility (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008; Bengali and Daly 2013; Bjørnskov et al. 2013; Corak 
2013; Kraus and Tan 2015).  
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Perceptions of Mobility and Support for Public Assistance 
Looking at the correlations in Table 3, all of the get ahead variables are significantly 
correlated with support for public assistance and in the directions hypothesized. A stronger 
belief that the ascribed characteristics, wealthy family, educated parents, and knowing the right 
people are required to get ahead is positively correlated with support for public assistance. This 
implies that a structural view of mobility and opportunities for mobility makes a person more 
likely to support spending on public assistance. Also in keeping with the hypothesis, a stronger 
belief in the importance of the attained characteristics, hard work and ambition, is negatively 
correlated with support for public assistance. This implies that those who have more 
individualistic views and see more opportunity for mobility are less likely to support spending on 
public assistance.  
 Looking at the control variables, again income was more strongly correlated with 
support for public assistance than any of the get ahead variables. The individual get ahead 
variables were more suitable for this regression rather than the composite for the purpose of 
examining their individual relationships with the public assistance variable. However, since the 
correlation of income with public assistance was higher than with any of the get ahead variables, 
a comparison to the getting ahead composite is called for to look for their combined effect.  For 
the get ahead composite and support for public assistance r = -.149, p < .001, which is still a 
weaker correlation than that of income. As the ANOVA also showed, however, income is a 
significant predictor of a respondent’s perceptions of what it takes to get ahead, so the get 
ahead variables already incorporate some of the effects of income in the above correlation 
where income is not controlled for. 
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 Sex was the only variable tested that was not significantly correlated with support for 
public assistance. Race, however, was second only to income in the strength of its correlation. 
These two results are not as hypothesized based on who is more likely to receive public 
assistance such as TANF. This suggests that something other than who actually receives such 
benefits is significantly affecting support or lack thereof for spending on such programs. The fact 
that the two strongest correlations with public assistance were income and race and that their 
addition to the model more than doubled the effect size suggests that they are more important 
determinants of support for public assistance than any of the get ahead variables. Setting aside 
the differences in the strengths of these correlations, even all of the significant correlations with 
support for public assistance must be considered weak since none even reach .20.   
To more stringently test for a relationship between views of what it takes to get and 
attitudes towards public assistance I performed the following regression analysis. A multiple 
linear regression produced significant but weakly effective predictive models for support for 
public assistance. The coefficients are in Table 9 below. Model 1 includes all of the get ahead 
variables as predictors. Model 2 includes all of the get ahead variables plus income as quintiles, 
sex, and race. Model 3 includes all of the get ahead variables plus income as the category 
midpoint in dollars, sex, and race. For model 1 F(5,1351) = 7.948, p < .001 with an R2 = .029 
(adjusted R2 = .025) showing it accounted for only 2.9% of the variance in support for public 
assistance. For Model 2 F(8,1348) = 11.321, p < .001 with an R2 = .064 (adjusted R2 = .058) showing 
that is accounted for only 6.4% of the variance in support for public assistance. For Model 3 
F(8,1348) = 11.091, p < .001 with an R2 = .062 (adjusted R2 = .057) showing that is accounted for 
only 6.2% of the variance in support for public assistance. 
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Table 9. Models of Predictors of Attitudes Towards Public Assistance  
 Model 1, R² = .029 Model 2, R² = .064 Model 3, R² = .062 
   (Income Quintiles) (Income $ Midpoint) 
  b SE b  β   b SE b β    b SE b  β 
Intercept 3.795** 0.135  4.003** 0.153  3.863** 0.146  
Wealthy Family 0.007** 0.029 0.008 0.015** 0.029 0.016 0.015** 0.029 0.016 
Educated Parents -0.129** 0.035 -0.111 -0.101** 0.035 -0.086 -0.103** 0.035 -0.088 
Know Right People -0.085** 0.035 -0.072 -0.054** 0.035 -0.045 -0.053** 0.035 -0.045 
Hard Work 0.138** 0.053 0.080 0.130** 0.052 0.075 0.131** 0.052 0.075 
Ambition 0.049** 0.048 0.032 0.012** 0.047 -0.008 0.012** 0.047 0.008 
Income    -0.120** 0.020 -0.164 -3.871** 0.000 -0.159 
Sex    0.019** 0.055 0.009 0.019** 0.055 0.013 
Race       0.194** 0.068 0.079 0.194** 0.068 0.081 
*p < .05     **p < .01      (one-tailed test)     n = 1357 
 
The addition of income, sex, and race more than doubled the still weak predictive power 
of the model making the get ahead variables look like weaker predictors by comparison. Before 
introducing the controls three of the five get ahead variables appear to be significant predictors, 
educated parents, know the right people, and hard work. After controlling for income, sex, and 
race, only educated parents, and hard work are still significant. Though not all of the get ahead 
variables are significant predictors of attitudes towards public assistance as hypothesized, the 
ones that are significant do have the relationships of the hypothesized types. Since the get 
ahead questions are coded as Essential = 1, Very Important = 2, Fairly Important = 3, Not Very 
Important = 4, Not Important at All = 5, the negative coefficient for educated parents show that 
those who say it less important are less likely to support public assistance. This fits with the 
hypothesis and earlier findings that those who feel ascribed characteristics are less important to 
getting ahead and therefore see more opportunity for mobility through individual effort, will be 
more likely to oppose spending on public assistance. Similarly, those who have less meritocratic 
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views on what it takes to get ahead and answered that hard work was less important to getting 
ahead, were more likely to support spending public assistance. 
Just as it was individually in the correlations, sex was also not significant as part of Model 
2 or Model 3. Looking at the standardized betas income is the strongest predictor with race and 
the two significant get ahead variables all around the same lower levels. Income has a negative 
relationship with support for public assistance; higher income respondents were more likely to 
oppose spending on public assistance. Since race was coded as white = 0 and all races other than 
white = 1, the positive coefficient indicates that white respondents were significantly less likely 
to support public assistance as predicted and suggested by previous research. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
There is a relationship between income and views of what it takes to get ahead. Though 
the views of mobility found in this research seem relatively high at each income level compared 
to measured mobility, the lower income group has more limited views of mobility than the 
middle income group which mirrors the lower levels of experienced mobility of the lowest 
income quintile compared to the middle three. Furthermore, views on the importance of 
educated parents and working hard are significant predictors of attitudes on public assistance. 
As predicted, belief in the less meritocratic indicator, educated parents was associated with 
support for public assistance while those who thought hard work was more important were less 
likely to support it. Income proved to be a stronger predictor, however.  
Americans’ overestimation of the level of mobility in the U.S. may or may not be 
impacting public policy preferences as Jäntti et al. (2006) suggested, but since the effects of 
perception of what it takes to get ahead here were weak and limited, any lack of pressure for 
policies to reduce inequalities is difficult to attribute to it as they suggest. However, looking back 
to the getting ahead composite means for the three income groups, perhaps even among the 
group who saw the least opportunity for mobility, the perception was still too strong to facilitate 
a desire for different policies.  
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The findings in this research that low income and non-white respondents were less likely 
to believe in meritocratic ways of getting ahead contrasts with the findings of Davidai and 
Gilovich (2015). They found that lower income and non-white respondents perceived upward 
mobility was more likely than did higher income and white respondents (Davidai and Gilovich 
2015). Rather than views that justified their relative positions they found that “Those who have 
more to lose from the current financial system, it seems, are more likely to see it as more 
dynamic” (Davidai and Gilovich 2015:64). While apparent disagreement of the results of this 
research and theirs cannot be fully explained there are important methodological differences.  
The first difference is that their data are more recent, collected in 2014, so a change in 
the general economic outlook over time is possible, but unlikely to be this extreme. Second, the 
data were collected completely online so respondents were less likely to temper their answers 
because of concerns of judgement by an interviewer, but perhaps more likely to give the 
questions less thought. It is unclear whether they took steps to ensure that the requirement of 
internet access did not result in a skewed sample. Most importantly, however, they directly 
asked people hypothetical questions about the chances of a person in a given income quintile 
making it to a different specific quintile. For the lowest they asked for the chances of that 
hypothetical person moving up two quintiles or more. This is quite different from asking 
questions about what it takes to get ahead which has more to do with opportunity for mobility 
rather than experienced mobility. 
As stated previously the distinction between opportunity for mobility and experienced 
mobility is often not made. There is also not sufficient research on how people tend to 
conceptualize each. Can it be assumed that if someone is not upwardly mobile it is because he 
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or she did not have opportunity, or can we allow for the possibility that a person has 
opportunities they do not exploit? In considering opportunities not taken, how could that be 
measured? What obstacles would be considered? None of this is well defined. In Davidai and 
Gilovich’s (2015) were the participants intended to assume that the hypothetical situations they 
were asked about were governed by the presence or lack of opportunity for mobility or were 
they intended to make judgements about that individual’s ability to control his or her own fate? 
Opportunity for mobility could hypothetically come in many forms. As an example, 
acquaintance A could tell acquaintance B that acquaintance A’s employer is trying to recruit 
someone with acquaintance B’s skills for a prestigious job that pays more than he is currently 
making. Acquaintance A could offer to recommend acquaintance B to his employer making him 
far more likely to get the job. Acquaintance B could chose to follow up on the opportunity or not. 
If he does not end up pursuing and getting the position, this would not be captured on any 
measure of experienced mobility, but he still had the opportunity. However, it conceivably could 
be encompassed by the knowing the right people survey question used in this research.  
Research that includes measures that assess a respondent’s views on opportunity for 
mobility as well as asking questions similar to those used by Davidai and Gilovich (2015) would 
allow important and never before possible comparison of such views. Since perception of 
mobility is an under researched area, more research is needed of this kind and others.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
Though there are a number of factors that could impact the results related to the support 
for public assistance variable, but it is not clear that even if those were somehow controlled for 
that the get ahead variables would become stronger predictors. First, the phrasing of the 
question in the survey might have been suggestive. Though a Likert scale was used for the 
answers, the question’s phrasing as “The government should spend less on benefits to the poor” 
(ISSP 2012) might have been suggestive and resulted in the low to moderate mean of 2.433 when 
recoded as support for public assistance where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree. 
Further, “benefits to the poor” may not have been interpreted by respondents as public 
assistance but rather any number of other government spending programs that the respondent 
may have had other feelings about.  
Also, as previously noted, these data were collected in mid-2010, only a year into the 
recovery following the official end of The Great Recession (Nation Bureau of Economic Research 
2010). Previous research has established that such conditions can increase support for public 
assistance (Carney et al. 2008; Jost et al 2009; Kam and Nam 2008). However, the issue here is 
more complex than simple support or opposition, but more its correlation with perceptions of 
what it takes to get ahead, so it is not safe to make any kind of adjustments or assumptions 
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based on the timing of the data collection. Regarding the coding of income, using the dollar 
value of the midpoint for each category intuitively seems like it would be a more representative 
coding scheme where possible. It is important to remember, however, that the greater than 
$150,000 category, which 93 respondents of 1357 said they were a part of, was represented by 
$150,000. Exact figures would have made the most difference for this category and likely would 
have produced stronger results. 
One additional consideration in interpreting the results of this research is that this 
perception data focuses on upward mobility rather than both upward and downward. However, 
adding the possibility for downward mobility could only add to the already high mobility 
perceptions found here, therefore this does not explain the differences in the perception results 
in this work and the results from previous work on experienced mobility. As previously 
addressed, another potential limitation is that the get ahead questions are representative of 
how important the respondents believe specific characteristics are to upward mobility, so the 
results do not translate as directly to levels of mobility as the results produced by Davidai and 
Gilovich (2015) and Chambers et al. (2015). More work of both types is needed, however. 
Research that incorporates wealth rather than just income is also too scarce. Wealth appears to 
be a less common measure because the data is even more difficult to obtain, but since wealth is 
a better indicator of SES than income, it could produce results more representative of real world 
experience.  
Previous research on beliefs about mobility and the causes of poverty has been used to 
contextualize the results of research on perceptions of mobility and inequality in this and other 
research, but it essentially amounts to well informed speculation if it is not part of the data. 
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Taking the best aspects of this research and studies where the questions more directly 
addressed levels of mobility is the next logical step. Research where respondents are asked not 
just for their assessments of mobility, but also for the reasons for those views would provide the 
most valuable insight. Similarly, the relationship between opportunity for mobility and achieved 
mobility may be in need of further clarification. Furthermore, though income was the most 
important demographic issue in this work and sex and race were also incorporated, future 
research of a similar kind examining differences in perceptions based on age and other 
demographics would be a useful addition to the literature. Because of sample size and other 
limitations, this data did not lend itself to a detailed examination of possible effects of 
intersectionality of such variables, though such work could provide valuable insight. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
As hypothesized Jäntti et al. (2006) were correct that there are different perceptions of 
mobility at different income levels and that difference could partially explain why the average 
perception is higher than measurements of mobility. The effect shown in the data was in line 
with their suggestion, but it was too small to account for the incongruously high American 
perceptions of mobility that Jäntti et al. (2006) suggested are the result of the income based 
differences. As they also maintained, such perceptions do have an impact on ideas about public 
policy such as spending on public assistance. Here also though, such perceptions and even 
income only explain a small part of the variance. There are clearly other forces at work not 
captured in these data. 
Given the higher perception of those in the middle experiencing more mobility and those 
at the top who have other reasons to perceive more opportunity for mobility, it is not surprising 
that average perceptions are not matching the experiences of those at the bottom. Again, 
however, this is only a partial explanation since even when compared to countries with similar 
levels of mobility at the middle, the US perceives more. While comparing perceived mobility to 
experienced mobility is difficult to do with precision, international comparisons help to highlight 
discrepancies. It seems that after accounting for income based differences, there is still simply 
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an American difference that is not accounted for by this data. The American Dream lives on in 
the mind even if not in the bank account.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
Abner, Kristin. 2011. “Determinants of Welfare Policy Attitudes: A Contextual Level of 
Analysis.” Sociological Spectrum 31:466-497. 
 
Acs, Gregory and Seth Zimmerman. 2008. “Like Watching Grass Grow? Assessing Changes in 
U.S. Intragenerational Economic Mobility Over the Past Two Decades.” Washington, 
D.C.: Pew Charitable Trusts, Pew Foundation Economic Mobility Project. 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. 
The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote. 2001. “Why Doesn’t the US Have a 
European-Style Welfare System?” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 8524) Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved 
December 16, 2014 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w8524). 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert MacCulloch. 2004. “Inequality and Happiness: Are 
Europeans and Americans Different?” Journal of Public Economics 88:2009-2042. 
 
Amiel, Yoram, Michele Bernasconi, Frank Cowell, and Valentino Dardanoni. 2015. “Do We 
Value Mobility?” Social Choice and Welfare 44:231-255. 
 
Andrews, Dan and Andrew Leigh. 2009. “More Inequality, Less Social Mobility.” Applied 
Economics Letters 16:1489-1492. 
 
Appelrouth, Scott and Laura Desfor Edles.  2012.  Classical and Contemporary Sociological 
Theory, 2nd edition.  Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.Auten, Gerald and Geoffrey Gee. 2009. 
“Income Mobility in the United States: New Evidence from Income Tax Data.” National 
Tax Journal 62(2):301-328. 
 
Arawatari, Ryo and Tetsuo Ono. 2013. “Inequality, Mobility and Redistributive Politics.” Journal 
of Economic Theory 148:353-375. 
 
Auten, Gerald and Geoffrey Gee. 2009. “Income Mobility in the United States: New Evidence 
from Income Tax Data.” National Tax Journal 62(2):301-328. 
61 
 
Bartels, Larry. 2005. “Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American 
Mind.” Perspectives on Politics 3(1):15-31. 
 
Bartels, Larry. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Becker, Gary S. and Nigel Tomes. 1986. “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families.” 
Journal of Labor Economics 4(3-2):S1-S39. 
 
Beller, Emily and Michael Hout. 2006. “Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United States in 
Comparative Perspective.” The Future of Children Journal Issue: Opportunity in America 
16(2):19-36. 
 
Benabou, Roland and Efe A. Ok. 2001. “Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The 
POUM Hypothesis.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics May Issue: 447-487. 
 
Bengali, Leila and Mary Daly. 2013. "U.S. Economic Mobility: The Dream and the Data." FRBSF 
Economic Letter, 2013(6):1-4. 
 
Bennett, William (Host). 2014, March 12. Morning in America radio show episode. Executive 
Producer: Chris Beach. Irving, TX: Salem Radio Network. 
 
Björklund, Anders and Markus Jäntti, M. 1997. “Intergenerational income mobility in Sweden 
compared to the United States.” American Economic Review 87(4):1009-1018. 
 
Bjørnskov, Christian, Axel Dreher, Justina A.V. Fischer, Jan Schnellenbach, Kai Gehring. 2013. 
“Inequality and Happiness. When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do 
Not Match.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 91:75-92. 
 
Blanden, Jo. 2013. “Cross-Country Rankings in Intergenerational Mobility- A Comparison of 
Approaches from Economics and Sociology.” Journal of Economic Surveys 27(1):38-73. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power, edited by John B. Thompson, Translated 
by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Bradbury, Katherine. 2011. “Trends in U.S. Family Income Mobility, 1969–2006.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper Series. Retrieved February 24, 2014 
(http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2011/wp1110.htm). 
 
Bradbury, Katherine and Jane Katz. 2002. “Are Lifetime Incomes Growing More Unequal? 
Looking at New Evidence on Family Income Mobility.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Regional Review 12(4):3-5. 
62 
 
Bullock, Heather E., Wendy R. Williams, and Wendy M. Limbert. 2003. “Predicting Support for 
Welfare Policies: The Impact of Attributions and Beliefs About Inequality.” Journal of 
Poverty 7(3):35-56.  
 
Carey, Ralph A. 1973. “The Horatio Alger Myth.” Fides Et Historia 5(1-2):1-9. 
 
Carroll, Robert, David Joulfaian, and Mark Rider. 2006. “Income Mobility: The Recent American 
Experience.” Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Working Paper Series No. 06-20. 
Atlanta, GA: Georgia State University. 
 
Causa, Orsetta and Åsa Johansson. 2010. “Intergenerational Social Mobility in OECD 
Countries,” OECD Journal: Economic Studies 2010(1):1-44. 
 
Chambers, John R., Lawton Swan, and Martin Heesacker. 2014. “Perceptions of U.S. Social 
Mobility Are Divided (and Distorted) Along Ideological Lines.” Psychological Science 
26(4):413-423. 
   
Chauvin, Keith W., and Ronald A. Ash. 1994. "Gender Earnings Differentials in Total Pay, Base 
Pay, and Contingent Pay." Industrial & Labor Relations Review 47(4):634-649. 
 
Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, Emmanuel Saez, and Nicholas Turner. 2014a. 
The Equality of Opportunity Project. Data retrieved from (http://www.equality-of-
opportunity.org/index.php/data). 
   
Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, Emmanuel Saez, and Nicholas Turner. 2014b. “Is 
the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational 
Mobility.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 104(5): 141-147. 
 
Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez. 2014c. “Where is the Land 
of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(4): 1553-1623. 
 
Collins, Chuck and Felice Yeskel. 2005. Economic Apartheid in America. New York: The New 
Press. 
 
Corak, Miles. 2006. “Do Poor Children Become Poor Adults? Lessons from a Cross Country 
Comparison of Generational Earnings Mobility.” Research on Economic Inequality 
13(1):143-188. 
 
Corak, Miles. 2013. “Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational 
Mobility.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(3):79-102. 
 
63 
 
Corak, Miles, Matthew J. Lindquist, and Bhashkar Mazumder. 2014. A Comparison of Upward 
and Downward Intergenerational Mobility in Canada, Sweden and the United States. 
Working Paper. Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University. 
 
Currier, Erin and Diana Elliott. 2012. “Economic Mobility in the United States: Current Research 
and Policy Strategies.” Conference Report, Disrupting the Poverty Cycle: Emerging 
Practices to Achieve Economic Mobility. Boston, MA: Crittenton Women’s Union.  
 
d’Addio, Anna Cristina. 2007. “Intergenerational Transmission of Disadvantage: Mobility or 
Immobility Across Generations? A Review of the Evidence for OECD Countries.” OECD 
Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
 
Davidai, Shai and Thomas Gilovich. 2015. “Building a More Mobile America—One Income 
Quintile at a Time.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 10(1):60-71. 
 
Dorsch, Michael. 2010. “Social Mobility and the Demand for Public Consumption 
Expenditures.” Public Choice 142:25-39. 
 
Druckman, James N., and Lupia, Arthur. 2000. “Preference Formation.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 3:1–24. "Opinion Poll on Economic Mobility and the American Dream." 
Washington, DC: Pew Charitable Trusts. 
(http://www.pewstates.org/research/analysis/opinion-poll-on-economic-mobility-and-
the-american-dream-85899378651). 
  
Economic Mobility Project. 2012. "Pursuing the American Dream: Economic Mobility Across 
Generations." Washington, DC: Pew Center on the States. 
(http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/pursuing-the-american-dream-
85899403228). 
 
Ellemers, Naomi. 2001. “Individual Upward Mobility and the Perceived Legitimacy of 
Intergroup Relations.” Pp. 205-222 in The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging 
Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations, edited by John T. Jost and 
Brenda Major.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Epstein, William M. 2004. “Cleavage in American Attitudes Toward Social Welfare.” Journal of 
Sociology and Social Welfare 31(4):177-201. 
 
Erikson, Robert and Goldthorpe, John. H. 2002. “Intergenerational inequality: A Sociological 
Perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(3):31-44. 
 
Ferrie, Joseph. 2005. “The End of American Exceptionalism? Mobility in the U.S. Since 1850.” 
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11324) Cambridge, MA: 
64 
 
National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved December 16, 2014 
(http://www.nber.org/papers/w11324). 
 
Fields, Gary and Efe A. Ok. 1999. “The Measurement of Income Mobility: An Introduction to 
the Literature.” Pp. 557-596 in Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement. Norwell, 
MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Fong, Christina. 2001. “Social Preferences, Self-Interest, and the Demand for Redistribution.” 
Journal of Public Economics 82:225-246. 
 
Franko, William, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Christopher Witko. 2013. “Inequality, Self-Interest, 
and Public Support for “Robin Hood” Tax Policies.” Political Research Quarterly 
66(4):923-937. 
 
Fullerton, Andrew S. and Jeffery C. Dixon. 2009. “Racialization, Asymmetry, and the Context 
of Welfare Attitudes in the American States.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 
37(1):95-120.  
 
Furnham, Adrian. 1983. “Attributions for Affluence.” Personality and Individual Difference 4:31-
40. 
  
Gans, Herbert J. 1994. “Positive Functions of the Undeserving Poor: Uses of the Underclass in 
America.” Politics & Society 22(3):269-283. 
 
Gilens, Martin. 2009. “Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation.” Political Science and 
Politics 42(2):335-41. 
 
Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz. 2008. The Race Between Education and Technology. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
 
Gottschalk, Peter, and Sheldon Danziger. 2005. “Inequality of Wage Rates, Earnings, and 
Family Income in the United States, 1975-2002.” Review of Income and Wealth 51(2): 
231-254. 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Auintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers. 
 
Griffith, Victoria. 2001, January 21. “The Myth of Upward Mobility.” Financial Times. 
 
Guetzkow, Joshua. 2010. “Beyond Deservingness: Congressional Discourse on Poverty, 1964-
1996.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 629:173-
197. 
 
65 
 
Harrits, Gitte Sommer. 2013. “Class, Culture and Politics: On the Relevance of a Bourdieusian 
Concept of Class in Political Sociology.” The Sociological Review 61:172-202. 
 
Hauser, Robert M. 2010. “Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the United States Measures, 
Differentials and Trends.” CDE Working Paper 98-12. Center for Demography and 
Ecology, University of Madison-Wisconsin. http://ssc.wisc.edu/cde/cdewp/98-12.pdf. 
 
Herrnstein, Richard J., and Charles A. Murray. 1994. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class 
Structure in American Life. New York: Free Press. 
 
Hertz, Tom. 2005. “Rags, Riches, and Race: The Intergenerational Economic Mobility of Black 
and White Families in the United States.” Pp. 165-191 in Unequal Chances: Family 
Background and Economic Success, edited by Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and 
Melissa Osborne Groves. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hungerford, Thomas. 2008. Income Inequality, Income Mobility, and Economic Policy: U.S. 
Trends in the 1980s and1990s CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. 
 
Hussey, Laura S. and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. 2011. “The Changing Role of Race in Social 
Welfare Attitude Formation: Partisan Divides over Undocumented Immigrants and 
Social Welfare Policy.” Political Research Quarterly 66(4):572-584.  
 
Isaacs, Julia, Isabel Sawhill and Ron Haskins. 2008. “Getting Ahead or Losing Ground: 
Economic Mobility in America.” Economic Mobility Project, The Pew Charitable Trusts 
and the Brookings Institution. 
(http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/02/economic-mobility-sawhill). 
 
ISSP Research Group. 2002. International Social Survey Programme: Social Inequality III - ISSP 
1999. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5400 Data file Version 1.0.0 and Questionnaire. 
 
ISSP Research Group. 2012. International Social Survey Programme: Social Inequality IV - ISSP 
2009. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5400 Data file Version 3.0.0 and Questionnaire. 
 
Jacobs, Lawrence and Theda Skocpol. 2005. ‘‘American Democracy in an Era of Rising 
Inequality.’’ Pp. 1-18 in Inequality and American Democracy: What We Know and What 
We Need to Learn, edited by Lawrence Jacobs and Theda Skocpol. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
 
Jäntti, Markus,  Bernt Bratsberg, Knut Røed,  Oddbjørn Raaum, Robin Naylor,  Eva Österbacka, 
Anders Björklund, and Tor Eriksson. 2006. American Exceptionalism in a New Light: A 
Comparison of Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in the Nordic Countries, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Bonn, Germany:  Institute for the Study of Labor. 
66 
 
Jost, John T., Federico, Christopher, and Napier, Jaime L. 2009. “Political Ideology: Its 
Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities.” Annual Review of Psychology 60:307-337. 
 
Kam, Cindy, & Nam, Yunju. 2008. Reaching Out or Pulling Back: Macroeconomic Conditions 
and Public Support for Social Welfare Spending. Political Behavior 30(2):223-258. 
 
Katz, Michael B. 2013. The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kelly, Nathan J. and Peter K. Enns. 2010. “Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The 
Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences.” American 
Journal of Political Science 54(4):855-870. 
 
Kertscher, Tom. 2014. “In context: Were Paul Ryan’s poverty comments a ‘thinly veiled racial 
attack’?”  Retrieved December 16, 2014 
(http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2014/mar/14/context-paul-ryans-poverty-
comments-racial-attack/). 
 
Kingfisher, Catherine P. 1999. “Rhetoric of (Female) Savagery: Welfare Reform in the United 
States and Aotearoa/New Zealand.” The National Women's Studies Association Journal 
11(1):1-20. 
 
Kluegel, James and Eliot Smith. 1986. Beliefs about Inequality: Americans’ Views of What Is and 
What Ought to Be. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Kraus, Michael W. and Jacinth J.X.Tan. 2015. “Americans Overestimate Social Class Mobility.” 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 58:101-111. 
 
Ladd, Everett Carll, and Karlyn H. Bowman. 1998. Attitudes Toward Economic Inequality. 
Washington, D.C.: AEI Press publisher for the American Enterprise Institute. 
 
Lee, Chul-In and Gary Solon. 2009. “Trends in Intergenerational Income Mobility.” The Review 
of Economics and Statistics 91(4):766-772. 
 
Loseke, Donileen and Janine Beahm. 2013. “Culture in Social Policy:  The ‘American Dream’ 
and Social Welfare Reform.” Manuscript submitted for publication. Department of 
Sociology, University of South Florida, Tampa. 
 
Mazumder, Bhashkar. 2005. “Fortunate Sons: New Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in 
the United States Using Social Security Earnings Data.”   The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 87(2):235-255. 
 
67 
 
McCall, Leslie. 2005. ‘‘Do They Know and Do They Care? Americans’ Awareness of Rising 
Inequality.’’ Paper presentation at the Russell Sage Foundation Social Inequality 
Conference, University of California, Berkeley. Berkeley, CA. 
 
McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance 
of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
McMurrer, Daniel and Isabel Sawhill. 1996. “How Much Do Americans Move Up and Down the 
Economic Ladder?” Opportunity in America Series No. 3. Washington, D.C.: Urban 
Institute. 
 
Morris, Martina and Bruce Western. 1999. “Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the Twentieth 
Century.” Annual Review of Sociology 25:623-657. 
 
National Equal Pay Task Force. 2013. Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act:  Assessing the 
Past, Taking Stock of the Future. Washinton, DC: The White House.  
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/equalpay/equal_pay_task_force_progr
ess_report_june_2013_new.pdf). 
 
Nelson, Thomas E. 1999. “Group Affect and Attribution in Social Policy Opinion.” The Journal 
of Politics 61(2):331-362. 
 
Noah, Timothy. 2012. The Great Divergence: America’s Growing Inequality Crisis and What We 
Can Do About It. New York: Bloomsbury Press. 
 
Obama, Barack. 2013. “Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility.” Washington: DC. 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-
economic-mobility). 
 
O’Brien, Laurie T. and Brenda Major. 2009. “Group Status and Feelings of Personal 
Entitlement: The Roles of Social Comparison and System-Justifying Beliefs” ch. 17 in 
Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification, edited by John T. 
Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir. Oxford University Press: New York. 
 
Page, Benjamin I. and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2009. Class War? What Americans Really Think 
About Inequality. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 1994. “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?” The American 
Economic Review 84(3):600-621. 
 
Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-first Century. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
68 
 
Piketty, Thomas and Emmanuel Saez. 2003. “Income inequality in the United States: 1913–
1998.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118:1-39. 
 
Ridgeway, Cecilia. 2001. “The Emergence of Status Beliefs: From Structural Inequality to 
Legitimizing Ideology” Pp. 257-277 in The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging 
Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations, edited by John T. Jost and 
Brenda Major.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Robinson, James W. 2009. “American Poverty Cause Beliefs and Structured Inequality 
Legitimation.” Sociological Spectrum: Mid-South Sociological Association 29(4):489-518. 
 
Shepelak, Norma J. 1987. “The Role of Self-Explanations and Self-Evaluations in Legitimating 
Inequality.” American Sociological Review 52(4):495-503. 
 
Smith, Tom W., Peter V. Marsden, Michael Hout, Jibum Kim.2013. General Social Surveys, 
1972-2012. [machine-readable data file]. Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-
Principal Investigators, Peter V. Marsden and Michael Hout, NORC ed. Chicago: 
National Opinion Research Center, producer, 2005; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, distributor. 1 data file (57,061 
logical records) and 1 codebook (3,422 pp). 
 
Solon, Gary. 1992. “Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States.” The American 
Economic Review 82(3):393-408. 
 
Solon, Gary. 2004. “A Model of Intergenerational Mobility Variation over Time and Place.” Pp. 
38-47 in Generational Income Mobility in North America and Europe, edited by Miles 
Corak. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, England. 
 
Steensland, Brian.  2006.  “Cultural Categories and the American Welfare State: The Case of 
Guaranteed Income Policy.” American Journal of Sociology 111:1273-1326.  
 
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2012. The Price of Inequality. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2015. The Great Divide. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Torche, Florencia. 2015. “Analyses of Intergenerational Mobility: An Interdisciplinary Review.” 
Annals of the American Academy 657:37-62. 
 
Treier, Shawn and D. Sunshine Hillygus. 2009. “The Nature of Political Ideology in the 
Contemporary Electorate.” Public Opinion Quarterly 73(4):679-703. 
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and 
Families. 2012, August 8. Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients. 
69 
 
Retrieved December 2, 2013 
(http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/character/fy2010/fy2010-chap10-ys-
final). 
 
United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis. 1992a. “Household Income 
Changes over Time: Some Basic Questions and Facts.” Tax Notes 56:1065–74. 
 
United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis. 1992b. “Household Income 
Mobility During the 1980s: A Statistical Assessment Based on Tax Return Data.” Tax 
Notes 55: Special Supplement. 
 
Verhulst, Brad, Peter K. Hatemi, and Lindon J. Eaves. 2012. “Disentangling the Importance of 
Psychological Predispositions and Social Constructions in the Organization of 
American.” Political Psychology 33(3):375-393. 
 
Weber, Max. 1904. “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.” excerpted in Pp. 140-
150 of Classical and Contemporary Sociological Theory, 2nd edition by Scott Appelrouth 
and Laura Desfor Edles. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. 
 
Weigel, David. 2014. Paul Ryan and Charles Murray. Slate.com March 13, 2004. 
(http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2014/03/13/paul_ryan_and_charles_murray.html). 
 
Xu, Ping and James C. Garand. 2010. “Economic Context and Americans’ Perceptions of 
Income Inequality.” Social Science Quarterly 91(5):1220-1241. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
  
71 
 
Appendix A - Survey Materials 
 
 
GSS Codebook P. 160 – Respondent’s Sex 
 
 
 
 
GSS Codebook P. 161 – Respondent’s Race 
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GSS Codebook P. 186 – Total Family Income 
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GSS Codebook P. 2198-2201 – Get Ahead Variables 
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Note: The GSS codebook does not contain the exact phrasing for the 2010 versions of the class 
and public assistance variables. See frequency tables in Appendix B.  
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Appendix B - Frequency Tables 
 
The frequency tables below include only the cases used in this research. 
 
 
Respondent's Sex (SEX) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Male 625 46.1% 46.1% 
Female 732 53.9% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
 
 
Respondent's Race (RACE) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
White 1057 77.9% 77.9% 
Black 191 14.1% 92.0% 
Other 109 8.0% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
    
 
Respondent's Race Recoded 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
White 1057 77.9% 77.9% 
All Races Excluding White 300 22.1% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
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Total Family Income (INCOME06) 
  Midpoint Frequency % Cumulative % 
< $1,000 $500 13 1.0% 1.0% 
$1,000 - 2,999 $2,000 11 0.8% 1.8% 
$3,000 - 3,999 $3,500 12 0.9% 2.7% 
$4,000 - 4,999 $4,500 7 0.5% 3.2% 
$5,000 - 5,999 $5,500 11 0.8% 4.0% 
$6,000 - 6,999 $6,500 6 0.4% 4.4% 
$7,000 - 7,999 $7,500 14 1.0% 5.5% 
$8,000 - 9,999 $9,000 23 1.7% 7.1% 
$10,000 - 12,499 $11,250 42 3.1% 10.2% 
$12,500 - 14,999 $13,750 45 3.3% 13.6% 
$15,000 - 17,499 $16,250 39 2.9% 16.4% 
$17,500 - 19,999 $18,750 35 2.6% 19.0% 
$20,000 - 22,499 $21,250 53 3.9% 22.9% 
$22,500 - 24,999 $23,750 40 2.9% 25.9% 
$25,000 - 29,999 $27,500 76 5.6% 31.5% 
$30,000 - 34,999 $32,500 86 6.3% 37.8% 
$35,000 - 39,999 $37,500 65 4.8% 42.6% 
$40,000 - 49,999 $45,000 133 9.8% 52.4% 
$50,000 - 59,999 $55,000 120 8.8% 61.2% 
$60,000 - 74,999 $67,500 128 9.4% 70.7% 
$75,000 - 89,999 $82,500 115 8.5% 79.1% 
$90,000 - $109,999 $100,000 96 7.1% 86.2% 
$110,000 - $129,999 $120,000 52 3.8% 90.1% 
$130,000 - $149,999 $140,000 42 3.1% 93.1% 
≥$150,000 $150,000 93 6.9% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
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Total Family Income in Quintiles 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Q1 258 19.0% 19.0% 
Q2 255 18.8% 37.8% 
Q3 318 23.4% 61.2% 
Q4 243 17.9% 79.1% 
Q5 283 20.9% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
 
 
Total Family Income In Collapsed Quintiles 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Low, Q1 258 19.0% 19.0% 
Mid, Q2-Q3 816 60.1% 79.1% 
High, Q5 283 20.9% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
 
 
Social Class (CLASS/CLASS1) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Lower 51 3.8% 3.8% 
Working 491 36.2% 40.1% 
Lower Middle 186 13.7% 53.8% 
Middle 518 38.2% 92.2% 
Upper Middle 95 7.0% 99.2% 
Upper 11 0.8% 100.0% 
Total 1352 100.0%   
 
 
Social Class Collapsed 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Working (Lower and Working) 542 39.9% 40.1% 
Middle (Lower Middle and Middle) 704 51.9% 92.2% 
Upper (Upper Middle and Middle) 106 7.8% 100.0% 
Total 1352 100.0%   
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Importance of Wealthy Family to Getting Ahead (OPWLTH) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Essential 70 5.2% 5.2% 
Very Important 338 24.9% 30.1% 
Fairly Important 446 32.9% 62.9% 
Not Very Important 347 25.6% 88.5% 
Not Important At All 156 11.5% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
 
 
Importance of Educated Parents to Getting Ahead (OPPARED) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Essential 100 7.4 7.4% 
Very Important 572 42.2% 49.5% 
Fairly Important 506 37.3% 86.8% 
Not Very Important 141 10.4% 97.2% 
Not Important At All 38 2.8% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
 
 
Importance of Knowing the Right People to Getting Ahead (OPKNOW) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Essential 141 10.4% 10.4% 
Very Important 484 35.7% 46.1% 
Fairly Important 576 42.4% 88.5% 
Not Very Important 137 10.1% 98.6% 
Not Important At All 19 1.4% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
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Importance of Hard Word to Getting Ahead (OPHRDWRK) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Essential 614 45.2% 45.2% 
Very Important 687 50.6% 95.9% 
Fairly Important 50 3.7% 99.6% 
Not Very Important 4 0.3% 99.9% 
Not Important At All 2 0.1% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
 
 
Importance of Ambition to Getting Ahead (OPAMBIT) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Essential 564 41.6 41.6 
Very Important 683 50.3% 91.9% 
Fairly Important 94 6.9% 98.8% 
Not Very Important 14 1.0% 99.9% 
Not Important At All 2 0.1% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
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Get Ahead Composite Values 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
5 0 0.0% 0.0% 
6 0 0.0% 0.0% 
7 0 0.0% 0.0% 
8 0 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0 0.0% 0.0% 
10 0 0.0% 0.0% 
11 7 0.5% 0.5% 
12 16 1.2% 1.7% 
13 61 4.5% 6.2% 
14 131 9.7% 15.8% 
15 148 10.9% 26.8% 
16 192 14.1% 40.9% 
17 232 17.1% 58.0% 
18 213 15.7% 73.7% 
19 158 11.6% 85.3% 
20 112 8.3% 93.6% 
21 52 3.8% 97.4% 
22 20 1.5% 98.9% 
23 11 0.8% 99.7% 
24 3 0.2% 99.9% 
25 1 0.1% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
 
 
Government Should Spend Less On the Poor 
(Attitudes Towards Public Assistance) 
  Frequency % Cumulative % 
Strongly Agree 54 4.0% 4.0% 
Agree 194 14.3% 18.3% 
Neither 226 16.7% 34.9% 
Disagree 695 51.2% 86.1% 
Strongly Disagree 188 13.9% 100.0% 
Total 1357 100.0%   
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